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1. Introduction 
…in a jiffey.” (FW 625.32-33) 
As Beckett’s famous quote in the title suggests, the end paradoxically stands at 
the beginning of this study and forms just one of the many contradictions the 
beginning of this thesis, which was originally designed in a chiefly teleological 
way, but slowly assumed a more and more cyclical structure to the point of 
almost denying its own ending, implies. The imperative “Begin!” uttered towards 
the very beginning of Sirens (Ulysses 246.35) proves problematic in this context 
– how can an interpretation be conducted about a text that defies univocal 
interpretation? How can measureless and infinite time be measured and 
described? And finally, how can an ending that is not, in fact, formally existent, 
be analysed?  
Several authors before and after Joyce’s Ulysses and Finnegans Wake tried, 
and to some point also succeeded in capturing the ceaseless flow of time. 
Marcel Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu, for instance, might not only 
create a subjective feeling among the reader that the novel will never actually 
end - it is also a formidable example of the writer’s attempt to discuss the highly 
complex issue of time both on a philosophical level and on the level of plot and 
to provide an appropriate form for the transient nature of human life and the 
merciless and relentless quality of time’s passing, without arresting its eternal 
flow. Indeed, as Charles Baudelaire suggests in his article “The Painter of 
Modern Life”, writers around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century were seeking 
an expression for “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art 
whose other half is the eternal and the immutable” (13) with the help of novel 
and sometimes experimental techniques. In contrast to Joyce, for instance, 
Proust uses relatively straightforward grammar and lexis, although the general 
impetus of remembering events and objects from the past, which results in an 
associative web of thoughts that eventually triggers off much greater 
philosophical musings about life is to be found both in La recherché (cf. e.g. the 
famous “madeleine” episode, where the taste of a cookie leads to an instance of 
“involuntary memory” of Marcel’s childhood and he reconsiders his whole life as 
a result) and in Ulysses, although it has to be said that the amount abstract and 
metaphysical considerations is mostly limited to the character Stephen Dedalus. 
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Yet another similar attempt at capturing the free-flowing stream of thoughts as a 
way of expressing the unstoppable force of time, but also at placing a focus on 
easily overlooked everyday objects and events, which nevertheless suddenly 
become immensely important within the subjective realm of a character, is 
Virginia Woolf’s novel Mrs. Dalloway, consisting almost entirely of stream of 
consciousness. The exclusive subjectivity of an individual character’s point of 
view, which highlights thoughts that might be considered banal in different 
circumstances, and the celebration of everyday bagatelles is an important 
concept for both Woolf and Joyce.  
However, the technique of stream of consciousness and instances of interior 
monologue not only serve as a presentation of a character’s immediate 
thoughts, but also, on a narratological level, as an attempt at meticulously 
reproducing thoughts at the same moment they are conceived. Of course, in the 
realm of written words, this effect can merely be hinted at, as the real-life 
succession of thoughts is certainly much more rapid and overlaps occur very 
frequently than can ever be indicated in a necessarily linearly displayed text. 
The effect of stream of consciousness passages among the reader is generally 
a perceived lengthening of discourse time, and a slowing down (or even 
stoppage) of plot. While on that level, the narrative pace indeed comes to a 
standstill, so to speak, it accelerates at the same time as the reader enters the 
character’s loosely connected and quickly shifting thoughts.  
With both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, Joyce undertook attempts at 
capturing the never-ending flow of time, both by means of style and structure 
and by means of musings and philosophical considerations on the level of plot. 
In a way, both texts seem to be able to evade the necessity of an ending by 
constantly referring to the cyclical and / or timeless potential of the text itself and 
by stressing its possibility of re-“writing itself” in Roland Barthes’s terms. In both 
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, the aforementioned tendencies can be 
observed, not only on a formal level regarding the famous last / first sentence of 
Finnegans Wake, but also on a metaphorical level of negating finality and 
striving to counteract the flux of time by applying the poetic device of stream of 
consciousness – the most impressive example, of course, being the last chapter 
of Ulysses. The Homeric parallels applied in Ulysses, as well as the polyphony 
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of past and present voices in Finnegans Wake can also be seen as a means of 
introducing a timeless aspect, which persists beyond the text. 
The main focus of this thesis will be the distinction between cyclical and 
linear concepts of time and their respective representations in literature in 
connection with the idea that a teleological narrative structure suggests a linear 
development of plot towards an ending, while a cyclical one symbolises a 
rejection of closure and of a clear-cut definition of an ending. In some cases, 
however, both of these notions are transgressed and time assumes an infinite 
quality, as in Penelope, and to some degree, in the last chapter of Finnegans 
Wake. 
The theoretical background of my thesis is shaped by Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
warring concepts of time as proposed in Timaeus and Physics respectively 
(2.1). The idea of infinite time can be approximated by Henri Bergson’s notion of 
pure duration, which shall be discussed in 2.2. 
The third chapter will consist of an in-depth analysis of four representative 
chapters from Ulysses (Proteus, Hades, Aeolus and Penelope) and two major 
themes from Finnegans Wake connected to the topic of endings (Shem and 
Shaun and ALP).  
While several scholars have acknowledged and commented on the cyclical 
nature of Finnegans Wake and some have even investigated the topic of 
endings, non-endings and re-beginnings (cf. e.g. Kermode, Borg, Kumar), none 
of them have gone as far as to suggest that both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, 
in fact, succeed at questioning and also in a way abandoning the very concept 
of endings, while retaining a strong sense of structure at the same time. In 
addition, while the general structure and style of the works has been discussed 
in this context, an actual analysis of this aspect on the textual level itself and in 
connection with the characters’ own thoughts on this topic has not been 
conducted yet to my knowledge, except in connection with the concept of 
memory and mostly limited to Finnegans Wake (cf. e.g. Fulton, Rickard, Fagan).    
The (linearly) increasing length of the individual chapters of this thesis is 
defined by the growing complexity of the respective chapters and texts 
themselves. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Plato and Aristotle 
The main difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s approach of time is that 
Plato saw time as being created together with the heavens by God and as an 
approximated cyclical image of eternal time, which, as the term suggests, is 
necessarily anti-teleological and ever-moving,1 while Aristotle introduced a 
teleological approach to time and saw it as a process rather than a cycle.2 
In Timaeus, Plato gives an account of his idea of the creation of time:  
Wherefore [the Father] made an image of eternity which is time, having 
an uniform motion according to number, parted into months and days 
and years, and also having greater divisions of past, present, and future. 
These all apply to becoming in time, and have no meaning in relation to 
the eternal nature, which ever is and never was or will be; for the 
unchangeable is never older or younger, and when we say that he ‘was’ 
or ‘will be,’ we are mistaken, for these words are applicable only to 
becoming, and not to true being; and equally wrong are we in saying that 
what has become IS become and that what becomes IS becoming, and 
that the non-existent IS non-existent […] These are the forms of time 
which imitate eternity and move in a circle measured by number. (37c – 
38b) 
The most important idea in connection with Plato’s understanding of time is that 
it was created by God, and therefore has a beginning, while at the same time 
being circular and never-ending. Plato describes time with vocabulary that 
signifies timelessness when he suggests that it “ever is and never was or will 
be”. The cyclical nature of human time is derived from its similarity to eternal 
time, and as a further consequence to the Creator himself, who “moves in a 
circle turning within himself, which is the most intellectual of motions” (34a). 
Another very important aspect in this context is the “uniform motion” Plato 
mentions at the beginning of this quotation. Since time, according to Plato, 
imitates eternity (although it can never actually reach this endeavour since it is 
                                                 
1 Essentially, in accordance with Plato’s other works, the relation between eternal and human time can be 
viewed as idea (eternal time) and its (necessarily imperfect) mimesis (human time), the main difference 
between them being that eternal time does not move at all, but “is”, whereas human time, as an imperfect 
mimesis of this idea, follows a cyclical movement as an approximation of eternity. (cf. pp. 2 et seq.) 
2 In his work Geschichtsbild und Romankonzeption. Drei Typen des Geschichtsverstehens im Reflex der 
Form des englischen historischen Romans, Ewald Mengel discusses three kinds of views on history 
(teleological, circular and contingent) with regard to the English historical novel Here, teleology (as 
proposed by Sir Walter Scott) is associated with a belief in progress and juxtaposed to the idea of 
circularity (exemplified in the works of Charles Dickens), which suggests an upward as well as a 
downward moment, between which a balance must be achieved. While this idea is not yet present with 
Plato and Aristotle, it certainly can be seen as a continuation of their respective theories.  
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merely an “image of the eternal nature” [38c]), its motion must necessarily 
reflect the perfect “everlasting motion” (36e) of eternity itself. However, Plato 
stresses the fact that the mentioned divisions derived from number such as 
“months and days and years”, but also, on a greater scale, the divisions of 
“past, present, and future” are not, in fact, related to eternal time, since they are 
derived from number and therefore divisible, as opposed to eternity, which is 
uncountable and indivisible by definition. This distinction eventually goes back 
to that of “becoming” and “true being” in time: Whereas divisions of time are 
only possible if time is conceived of as a process of becoming, the notion of 
being in time stresses the everlasting presence of eternity. Further implications 
of this theory are that eternal time does not necessarily have a clear-cut 
beginning, but that it has always existed, while time as conceived of by human 
beings was wilfully created by God.3 This relation can be approximated 
metaphorically with the help of a distinction Plato makes slightly earlier in his 
argument, that between “the unchangeable and indivisible” (35a) and therefore 
divine, and “the divisible and corporeal”, although, of course, time is not in fact 
corporeal, but it certainly is divisible, as discussed above. Eternity is therefore 
presented as a static concept, while time, although imitating eternity, "move[s] in 
a circle measured by number” and is subject to constant circular motion. 
However, the stasis of eternity is not to be thought of as a singular point in time, 
but rather an all-encompassing, continuous presence.4 
The idea of circles and cycles as perfect shapes and movements respectively 
due to their imitation of the divine order is palpable throughout Timaeus and 
constitutes one of the major arguments of Plato’s thinking, or, as Benjamin 
Jowett suggests in the introduction to Timaeus, “[t]here is no principle so 
apparent in the physics of the Timaeus, or in ancient physics generally, as that 
of continuity” (19). Plato also introduces the concept of “a cycle or perfect year 
at the completion of which … [the planets] coincide” (39d). His argument is 
                                                 
3 Benjamin Jowett’s argument that Plato’s conception of the creation time is paradoxical, since it 
presupposes time to have existed already before its creation by God, can, I believe, be refuted due to the 
fact that Plato makes a clear distinction between eternal time on the one hand and created time on the 
other hand. It is precisely this distinction which resolves the paradox.  
4 Wolfgang von Leyden points out that Plato’s association of human time with number actually suggests 
that it can even be seen as “complementary to the statement that it is a likeness of eternity” and mentions 
“periodic repetition” as a characteristic of created time, thus stressing both its circularity and its 
successive moment. (cf. Wolfgang von Leyden, Time, Number, and Eternity in Plato and Aristotle. In: 
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 54, Plato and Aristotle Number (Jan., 1964), pp. 35-52; pp. 39 
et seq.) 
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driven by thoughts of a divine order reflected by cyclical concepts in the 
corporeal world. Hence, the cyclical becomes a representation and imitation of 
the divine, without the world ever developing or progressing in a linear sense, 
for if we follow Plato’s line of argument, a God-created world must be perfect in 
the moment of creation already. Plato’s view of time is therefore characterised 
by a strong sense of steady, unchangeable cyclical movement and a complete 
lack of teleology.  
Contrary to Plato, Aristotle propagated a teleological approach to time in 
Physics, suggesting that “time wastes things away, and […] all things grow old 
through time […] [f]or time is by its nature the cause […] of decay, since it is the 
number of change, and change removes what is” (IV.12.30). 
Aristotle’s argumentation starts out by a seemingly straightforward question, 
namely that of the nature of time. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not make a 
distinction between eternal and human time, nor does he give an account of the 
creation of time. Instead, he is concerned with the question whether time 
“belong[s] to the class of things that exist or to that of things that do not exist” 
(IV.10.2). His first consideration is that “it either does not exist at all or barely, 
and in an obscure way. One part of it has been and is not, while the other is 
going to be and is not yet.” (IV.10.3) This first definition, although naturally 
vague and tentative, alludes to one of the central concepts in Aristotle’s 
discussion of time, the “now”, which serves “as a statement of the difficulties 
about the attributes of time” (IV.10.17). Aristotle starts out by reflecting on the 
nature of the “now”, i.e. whether “it always remain[s] one and the same” or if “it 
[is] always other and other” (IV.10.7). Firstly, he examines the implications of 
the ”now” as being “always different”, deducing that  
if the ‘now’ which is not, but formerly was, must have ceased-to-be at 
some time, the ‘nows’ too cannot be simultaneous with one another, but 
the prior ‘now’ must always have ceased-to-be. […] [O]ne ‘now’ cannot 
be next to another, any more than point to point. If then it did not cease-
to-be in the next ‘now’ but in another, it would exist simultaneously with 
the innumerable ‘nows’ between the two – which is impossible. (IV.10.9-
12) 
Aristotle introduces the sense of a temporal “before” and “after”, between which, 
it seems at this point of Aristotle’s argumentation, there can be no seamless 
transgression; instead, the two “now”s, if perceived as different from each other, 
“cannot be simultaneous” or even “next to another”. Aristotle claims that two 
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“now”s cannot occupy the same place at once, which is a common notion in 
Ancient Greek philosophy (Bakalis 142)  when dealing with corporeal objects, 
but seems unusual if we bear in mind that he is dealing with highly abstract 
matters. Even if the “now” is seen as remaining “always the same” (IV.10.13), 
Aristotle argues that “the ‘now’ is a termination, and it is possible to cut off a 
determinate time” (IV.10.14). By suggesting a successive sequence of “now”s 
with clear-cut beginnings and endings (“the prior ‘now’ must always have 
ceased-to-be”), Aristotle rejects Plato’s cyclical notion of time already at this 
early stage of the argument. Apart from the obvious aspect that Aristotle is not 
concerned with the actual creation of time and the fact that he does not see 
time as revolving in a perfect circular manner but rather in a straightforward 
progressing line, the fact that he defines time as divisible and introduces the 
concept of “now”s as separate, distinguishable items in time, suggests a notion 
of time altogether different from Plato. 
The next aspect Aristotle discusses in connection with the nature of time is 
whether it is “motion” or “change” which he concludes by the rather cryptic 
remark that “time is neither movement nor independent of movement” (IV.11.5). 
The phrasing of the sentence preceding this statement (“But as time is most 
usually supposed to be (3) motion and a kind of change, we must consider this 
view” [IV.10.24]) already suggests a certain degree of scepticism concerning 
the validity of this definition. As expected, Aristotle dismisses this idea on the 
grounds that “time is present equally everywhere and with all things” and 
therefore not subject to change (or, in fact, movement, for “[w]e need not 
distinguish at present between ‘movement’ and ‘change’”[IV.10.29]). Another 
reason he gives for his refusal of the common view of time as movement is that 
“change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not: for ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ are 
defined by time […] but time is not defined by time, by being either a certain 
amount or a certain kind of it.” Aristotle therefore refutes the notion of time as 
movement by linking it to change and claiming that a movement in time cannot 
be the same as time itself. While this point appears logical and straightforward 
enough, it does not explain the passing of time, or indeed the common notions 
of past, present and future. However, at the beginning of the following section 
(IV.11), Aristotle acknowledges that “time [does not] exist without change” 
because we do not actively notice it changing, since we do not consider the 
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interval between two “now”s as time. Thus, “the soul seems to stay in one 
indivisible state, and when we perceive and distinguish [change] we say time 
has elapsed, evidently time is not independent of movement and change” 
(IV.11.5).  
It follows from these considerations that the passing of time is only perceived 
by humans in an active and conscious act of acknowledgement. In that case, 
“we perceive movement and time together” (IV.11.7), which suggests that time 
must be “something that belongs to movement” (IV.11.9), since it cannot be 
movement proper for the reasons given above. Aristotle then reflects on the 
nature of that movement, suggesting that “all magnitude is continuous. 
Therefore movement goes with the magnitude. […] Because the magnitude is 
continuous, the movement too must be continuous, and if the movement, then 
the time” (IV.11.10). While this assumption at first appears to be a 
reinforcement of Plato’s cyclical view of time, it becomes clear that the 
continuous movement Aristotle claims for time is not necessarily connected with 
circularity, but rather bears the concept of “’before’ and ‘after’” as markers of 
motion, which is typical of a linear progression of time, rather than a circular 
one.  
In accordance with Plato, Aristotle sees time as connected to number; 
however, he goes one step further than his predecessor by claiming time to be 
“a kind of number” (IV.11.22), since it can only be movement “in so far as it 
admits of enumeration” (IV.11.21). In the same context, he states that “[j]ust as 
motion is a perpetual succession, so also is time” (IV.11.22) and associates it 
with the “point; for the point also both connects and terminates the length – it is 
the beginning of one and the end of another. But when you take it in this way, 
using the one point as two, a pause is necessary, if the same point is to be the 
beginning and the end” (IV.11.38-40). The image of the pause is particularly 
important in this quote, since it denies the notion of a seamless transgression, 
but rather points to the consecutive aspect of events. Moreover, the mere 
suggestion that time can come to a standstill refutes the idea of ever-moving, 
uniform time as suggested in Timaeus. Aristotle elaborates further on this 
aspect by stating that time is not only “the measure of motion”, but also “of rest 
[…] – indirectly” (IV.12.34).  
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The main difference, however, between the two lines of argument is that 
Aristotle views time as oriented towards a certain goal (in the case of earthly life 
that goal equals decay and death), whereas according to Plato, time is 
everlasting and cyclical in nature. The following quotation sums up Aristotle’s 
teleological view convincingly: 
A thing, then, will be affected by time, just as we are accustomed to say 
that time wastes things away, and that all things grow old through time, 
and that there is oblivion owing to the lapse of time, but we do not say 
the same of getting to know or of becoming young or fair. For time is by 
its nature the cause rather of decay, since it is the number of change, 
and change removes what is. (IV.12.30-31) 
The destructive power of time is depicted very vividly in this quotation through 
the accumulation of imagery with a strong sense of decomposition, such as 
“time wastes things away”, “grow old through time”, “the cause … of decay”, 
“change removes what is”.   
The interplay between cyclical and linear time will provide the main 
theoretical grid for my analysis of the primary texts, together with Henri 
Bergson’s notions of “pure duration” and “simultaneity”, which shall be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
2.2 Henri Bergson 
In the second chapter of his major work Time and Free Will, entitled “The 
Multiplicity of Conscious States; The Idea of Duration”, Henri Bergson 
introduces the notions of “pure duration” and “simultaneity”, which are strongly 
connected to his ideas of time and space presented in the same context. 
Bergson’s main claim is that time can only be conceived of by an act of 
projection, or “symbolical representation” (87) by means of space, which serves 
as an auxiliary mediator between the events the human mind perceives through 
consciousness and their (necessarily simplified) representation in a manner 
communicable to other humans.  
As an example of this theory, Bergson proposes an analysis of the concept of 
“number”, which suggests that number is made out of “units […] assumed to be 
identical when they are counted” (76), but at the same time he claims that these 
units “must be somehow distinct from one another, since otherwise they would 
merge into a single unit” (ibid.). There are two possibilities of counting those 
units: firstly, the distinct units can be placed “side by side in an ideal space” 
 13 
(77), or “else we repeat fifty times in succession the image of a single one” 
(ibid.), creating a “series [which] lies in duration rather than in space” (ibid.). 
However, he argues, the second option implies the paradox that it would always 
be one and the same unit that is counted, thus completely leaving aside the 
above mentioned distinctness, or “multiplicity” (85), inherent therein. Thus, “we 
must retain the successive images and set them alongside each of the new 
units which we picture to ourselves: now, it is in space that such a juxtaposition 
takes place and not in pure duration” (ibid.). Bergson therefore argues that the 
counting of material objects (he uses sheep as his first example) is necessarily 
linked to the “intuition of space” (77), even though it is commonly (falsely, 
according to Bergson) associated with duration. He then goes on to state that 
any idea of number is necessarily interconnected with the idea of space, since  
when we add to the present moment those which have preceded it, as is 
the case when we are adding up units, we are not dealing with these 
moments themselves, since they have vanished for ever, but with the 
lasting traces which they seem to have left in space on their passage 
through it. (79, my emphasis) 
Bergson therefore emphasises the transient characteristic of time and 
juxtaposes it with the solidity and constant presence of space. Just like Aristotle, 
Bergson too uses the idea of an “interval of space” (83), which Aristotle calls 
“pause” (IV.12) in between a “mathematical point which is separated from the 
following point” (Bergson 83). However, contrary to Aristotle, Bergson uses this 
image as an example of the misrepresentation of number as a divisible unit, 
when in fact it is perceived as continual and indivisible by consciousness. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, views the pause as yet another exemplification of a 
linear progression of time, while Bergson holds that time and number are 
anything but linear (or cyclical, for that matter) and that this consecutive aspect 
is only realised in the moment of representation, because the multiplicity and 
the simultaneous perception inherent in consciousness cannot be expressed 
adequately.5 Bergson’s notion of time can be described as infinite and 
teleological at the same time, since on the one hand he emphasises the never-
ending flux of time (“a moment of time (…) cannot persist in order to be added 
to others” [87]) and stresses its “continuity” (83), while also drawing attention to 
                                                 
5 Except, as I will argue, by means of literature, especially that kind of literature which breaks with the 
common linguistic code and displays experimental tendencies in form and grammar, as Eco argues with 
regard to the open work. 
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the simultaneous perception of consecutive moments of time by consciousness, 
which presupposes a movement forwards, or at least in a given direction.  
Bergson differentiates between two kinds of multiplicity: “that of material 
objects, to which the conception of number is immediately applicable; and [that 
of] states of consciousness, which cannot be regarded as numerical without the 
help of some symbolical representation, in which a necessary element is space” 
(87). Again, the main focus lies on “symbolical representation” in space, which 
is the only way that states of consciousness become communicable, according 
to Bergson. He then gives his definition of space: “space is what enables us to 
distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one 
another; it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that of qualitative 
differentiation, and consequently it is a reality with no quality” (95). The 
important aspect in this quotation is that of “identical and simultaneous 
sensations”, which cannot be represented simultaneously (as they are 
perceived by consciousness), but must be laid out in space in order for the mind 
to be able to grasp it.6 It is of particular importance as well that Bergson calls 
the perceived sensations “identical”, whereas the mind describes them as 
different, thus reuniting both the idea of motion (if the sensations are seen as 
successive and distinct from each other in retrospect) and continuity through 
repetition (it is the same sensation over and over again). Bergson makes it very 
clear that “states of consciousness, even when successive, permeate one 
another” (98), blurring the boundaries of the individual states on the one hand 
and denying the notion a clear-cut end of one state and the beginning of 
another, and on the other hand again fusing the opposing ideas of teleology and 
cyclicality in the single image of multiplicity. The only event that makes states of 
consciousness appear external to one another is when they are “spread out in 
time, regarded as [an unbounded and] homogenous medium” (99). Due to the 
fact, however, that externality is a typical feature of space, Bergson concludes 
that “time […] is nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflective 
consciousness” (ibid.) and considers time, insofar as it is seen as a 
homogenous medium, reducible to space. From these theories Bergson then 
deduces the concept of “pure duration”, 
                                                 
6 Again, I would argue that a certain amount of simultaneity is expressible in literature, and even more so 
in performances of literature.   
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the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when 
our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state 
from its former states. For this purpose, it need not be entirely absorbed 
in the passing sensation or idea; […] Nor need it forget its former states: 
it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside 
its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past 
and the present states into an organic whole. (100) 
Once again, the emphasis lies on the “organic whole” made up not of 
successive, but of simultaneous perceptions, which are not set “alongside” one 
another and are therefore not distinguishable from one another, but instead 
subsumed and absorbed into one singular sensation. Bergson compares this 
sensation to “recall[ing] the notes of a tune, melting […] into one another. […] 
[E]ven if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one 
another” (ibid.). The image of musical notes and motifs overlaying one another 
is particularly important, as Bergson seems to suggest that in order to 
understand pure duration and simultaneity, it is necessary for the mind to 
conceive of another medium than that of language and science, namely music.7 
Again, Bergson mentions the “abstract thought” (101), which “project[s] time into 
space, […] and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, 
the parts of which touch without penetrating one another” (ibid.). This act of 
setting the simultaneously perceived events side by side, Bergson argues, 
necessarily introduces the idea of a three-dimensional space, since in order to 
be able to “perceive a line as a line, it is necessary to take up a position outside 
it, to take account of the void which surrounds it, and consequently to think a 
space of three dimensions” (103). It follows that space according to Bergson is 
merely a helpful tool for projecting and symbolically representing events 
perceived by consciousness, like pure duration or simultaneity, which the mind 
cannot conceive of otherwise and, perhaps more importantly, which the human 
being cannot communicate8 in any other way than by applying a linear 
description of three-dimensional events, for “as soon as we try to measure [pure 
duration], we unwittingly replace it by space” (106). 
Similarly to Plato, who views cyclical human time as an imperfect 
representation of eternal time, Bergson introduces the idea of space as an 
auxiliary (though faulty) medium for representing pure duration. Both Plato and 
Bergson are aware of the fact that they are working with ultimately flawed 
                                                 
7 This argument becomes especially important with regard to Sirens. 
8 Bergson stresses the importance of social communication towards the end of this chapter. 
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representations of the actual concept, which are nevertheless necessary for 
reasons of social communicability and pragmatic considerations connected with 
it. While in Plato’s line of argument, human time can only be but a reflection of 
eternity, since it can never reach the same amount of perfection as a concept 
devised by God, Bergson dismisses the spatial notion of time as a conceptual 
error related to the limits of the intellect, which can, according to him, be 
corrected. 
Both Bergson’s idea of pure duration and that of the permeability of states of 
consciousness display a certain degree of continuity, “without precise outlines, 
without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, 
without any affiliation with number” (104), therefore denying clear-cut divisions 
and boundaries and proposing an in(de)terminable state of multiplicity instead.9 
As a further logical consequence following from his arguments, Bergson 
dismisses the notion of public time, suggesting that time cannot in fact be 
measured, since it cannot be regarded as a “quantity” (107), even though it “has 
every appearance of a homogenous medium” (ibid.) and the “moments of 
duration seem to be external to one another” (ibid.) – however, the crucial point 
he is making here, as on various other occasions, is that it merely “appears” 
and “seem[s]” so, just as “the time which our clocks divide into equal portions 
[…] must be a measurable and therefore homogenous magnitude” (ibid.), but 
“[i]s nothing of the sort (ibid.). Instead of measuring time, we are actually 
“counting simultaneities” (108) according to Bergson. Summarising his former 
arguments, Bergson once again stresses his major point:  
within our ego, there is succession without mutual externality; outside the 
ego, in pure space, mutual externality without succession […] no 
succession, since succession exists solely for a conscious spectator who 
keeps the past in mind and sets the two oscillations or their symbols side 
by side in an auxiliary space. (108-109) 
Again, the notion of “auxiliary space” as a means of symbolical representation 
of the events perceived by consciousness is highly important, as well as that of 
a “conscious spectator”, without whom mutual externality would not be possible, 
for the ego perceives the successive moments in time as homogenous and 
interpenetrating before this mediation, rather than mutually exclusive. Note that 
even these two concepts do not exclude each other, since “a kind of exchange 
                                                 
9 The aspect of multiplicity will be further discussed in relation with Shem and Shaun in 3.3.  
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takes place” (109), for by way of habit and social code, the ego is used to 
dividing and measuring time according to oscillations of the clock, an influence 
not negligible in this context.10 
In the next section, Bergson deals with motion in connection with duration, 
his main argument being that motion, i.e. “successive positions of the moving 
body […] in space” (110-111), can only be perceived as homogenous and 
divisible at the same time, because consciousness is able to create a “mental 
synthesis” (ibid.) by “keep[ing] the successive positions in mind and 
synthesiz[ing] them” (ibid.), instead of considering them separate. Therefore, 
consciousness also views motion not as “an object but [as] a progress” (ibid.), 
which is an important aspect, especially in connection with the teleological 
aspect inherent therein. Again, as when dealing with the perceived indivisibility 
and immediateness of states of consciousness, Bergson uses the image of “a 
unity resembling that of a phrase in a melody” (ibid.) in this context, stressing its 
interconnectedness and inseparability, for without singular notes formed into a 
logical sequence, a tune could not be called a tune, and neither could singular 
notes be called a melody. Bergson concludes this section by pointing out that  
it is of the very essence of duration and motion, as they appear to our 
consciousness to be something that is unceasingly being done; thus 
algebra can represent the results gained at a certain moment of duration 
and the positions occupied by a certain moving body in space, but not 
duration and motion themselves. (119, my emphases) 
Just like before, Bergson stresses the aspect of “progress” in this quotation 
when he defines duration and motion as something “unceasingly being done”. 
Another very important argument he makes here is that neither duration nor 
motion can be adequately represented, since even space cannot serve as an 
auxiliary means of representation any more except for the “results gained at a 
certain moment” – a purpose which is diametrically opposed to his concept of 
duration and motion.  
Interestingly enough, Bergson claims the same incapacity for adequate 
representation for the medium of language at a later point in this chapter, 
namely when he is dealing with the “fundamental self” (129) and conscious 
states. Here he suggests that human emotions are “confused, ever changing, 
and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold of [them] without arresting 
                                                 
10 I will not go into detail on this aspect, since it is not of great relevance to my argument.  
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[their] mobility or fit it into its common-place forms without making it into public 
property” (ibid.).11 In the following chapters of my thesis, I shall argue that a 
certain usage of language, like that in literature, and more specifically literature 
which applies a certain amount of experimental or unusual grammar and / or 
lexis, or in other words heavily violates the common linguistic code can in fact 
be seen as an attempt at arriving at pure duration and motion, even if it can only 
ever be seen as a symbolical representation.  
This aspect will be further developed and discussed in the following chapters, 
in connection with my main focus, the distinction and interplay between cyclical 
and teleological representations of time. In this context, I will regard concepts of 
pure duration and simultaneity discussed in this chapter as ways in which linear 
time can be transgressed and as specimens of the impossibility to measure 
time except by approximated, yet inaccurate means of public time and examine 
their representation in the chosen literary texts.  
                                                 
11 The same argument is found with Georg Simmel, who claims that “[l]ife […] is always in latent 
opposition to form” (12).  
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3. James Joyce 
3.1  Ulysses 
James Joyce’s Ulysses presents the reader with a wholly novel concept and 
experience of time, challenging common notions of public time by showing up 
the arbitrariness of individual time perception in contrast to the socially defined 
clock-time. Not only are the events in Ulysses taking place in one single day, 
June 16th, 1904, thus creating a gap between the discourse time and the 
narrative time,12 but also the whole journey of the Odyssey, lasting for 
numerous years, is laid out in this single day. Occasionally, the novel seeks to 
counteract this discrepancy by undertaking an attempt at capturing the free-
flowing flux of individual time perception by means of interior monologue. In 
these sections, the reader is presented with a “form which the succession of our 
conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from 
separating its present state from its former states” (Bergson 100), thus striving 
to achieve a state that can be described by Henri Bergson’s notion of “pure 
duration”.  
While both Proteus and Penelope feature large amounts of stream of 
consciousness, other chapters, such as Lotus Eaters, display shorter or fewer 
passages of personal thought, as Leopold Bloom is mostly shown in interaction 
with other characters. His discourse is mediated by a 3rd person narrator, who 
interrupts Bloom’s thoughts by describing events taking place in the outside 
world: “So warm. His right hand once more slowly went over again: choice of 
blend, made of the finest Ceylon brands” (68.35-69.1). This technique 
demonstrates a discrepancy between the inner and the outer world, just as the 
whole text is constantly caught in a struggle between private and public time. 
However, several chapters include instances of onomatopoeia, which can be 
seen as a very condensed, instantaneous representation of a single moment 
where discourse time and narrative time overlap and therefore serves as a 
representation of simultaneity. 
 A genuine sense of simultaneity is achieved in the chapter attributed to the 
art of music, Sirens. In this polyphonic fugue, multiple voices overlap at the 
                                                 
12 For the concept of discourse and narrative time cf. Gerard Genétte: Narrative Discourse. An Essay in 
Method. Ithaca, NY et al.: Cornell UP, 1990. 
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same time. The voices are “no longer successive, but simultaneous” (Bergson 
101); the “notes of a tune”, which Joyce symbolically represents through 
language, “succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another” 
(Bergson 100). The individual motifs laid out at the beginning of the chapter 
develop in the course of the section. They are varied, lengthened, shortened, 
and build a dynamic whole that can almost be heard, creating an effect that is 
similar to a musical work. The motif of “Bronze by gold”, for instance, is taken 
up several times in the course of the chapter, always slightly differing from one 
usage to the next: “Bronze by gold heard the hoofirons, steelyringing.” (245.1), 
“Bronzelydia by Minagold. / By bronze, by gold, in oceangreen of shadow. 
Bloom. Old Bloom.” (246.20-21), “They threw young heads back, bronze 
gigglegold” (249.19). The second instance is particularly interesting, since there, 
the motif of “Bronze by gold” is already permeated by the one that is introduced 
as “Blew. Blue bloom is on the” at the beginning of the chapter (245.6). Indeed, 
Graham Allen argues that Ulysses itself can be described as a “polyphonic 
novel”, since  
we find not an objective, authorial voice presenting the relations and 
dialogues between characters but a world in which all characters, and 
even the narrator him- or herself, are possessed of their own discursive 
consciousnesses. The polyphonic novel presents a world in which no 
individual discourse can stand objectively above any other discourse; all 
discourses are interpretations of the world, responses to and calls to 
other discourses. (23) 
Once again, the focus of this argument lies on the individuality of various 
discourses, which are nevertheless strongly interlinked. Much as the discourses 
seem to differ, they still overlap at all times and cannot exist without each other, 
just as the individual themes of a fugue are meaningless on their own.13 It 
seems that Joyce has managed to create an effect of simultaneity by 
“borrowing” from the artistic sphere of music, thus letting the art of language 
and of music fulfil a “mutual penetration” (Bergson 101). Perhaps this section 
can therefore be read as a claim that it is possible to express in music what 
cannot be expressed by words. 
A chapter that is diametrically opposed to Sirens in terms of time perception 
is Oxen of the Sun. In this section, the history of English literature is told in a 
linear, chronological fashion, thus presenting a direct antithesis to the 
                                                 
13 A similar idea is taken up in Finnegans Wake with the topic of the warring twin brothers Shem and 
Shaun (cf. Chapter 3.2). 
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simultaneity achieved earlier on. In this chapter, like in the whole of Ulysses 
considering the Homeric parallel, the past is brought into the present, and even 
pervades it on a semantic level (since the characters of the present are 
entangled in the story of the past). Still, the chapter does not present an 
instance of “pure duration”, since the individual stages are more or less clearly 
marked through a change in style, thus ordering the discourse and stressing its 
“successive” (Bergson 101) nature. 
Eumaeus displays a wholly different approach to time, similar in effect to that 
of the interior monologue. In this chapter, time has slowed down completely; the 
words virtually “go to sleep” (Beckett 27), and the weariness of Stephen and 
Bloom is perceivable through the lethargic pace of language. The sentences are 
elongated, as is the subjective time perception of both the characters and the 
reader:  
His [Stephen’s] mind was not exactly what you would call wandering but 
a bit unsteady and on his expressed desire for some beverage to drink 
Mr Bloom, in view of the hour it was and there being no pumps of Vatry 
water available for their ablutions, let alone drinking purposes, hit upon 
an expedient by suggesting, off the reel, the propriety of the cabman’s 
shelter as it was called, hardly a stonesthrow away near Butt Bridge 
where they might hit upon some drinkables in the shape of a milk and 
soda or a mineral. (Ulysses 571.11-18). 
In Eumaeus, form and content combine to form an effective union, which, albeit 
successfully creating a strong bond with the reader, does not make the reading 
experience any more pleasurable for that same reason, in so far as it slows 
down the reading process and evokes a certain amount of weariness amongst 
the reader him- or herself. It is once again Samuel Beckett – although at this 
point referring to Finnegans Wake – who sums this thought up convincingly: 
“Here form is content, content is form. […] His writing is not about something, it 
is that something itself” (27). Just like Odysseus is forced to overcome many 
strenuous challenges before finally returning to Penelope, the reader seems to 
be forced to overcome this rather tiresome chapter. This serves as a means of 
identification with the original mythical figure on an abstract level, as clearly, in 
this section, the subjective perception of elongated time is not limited to the 
characters alone, but also involves the reader due to its unbreakable link 
between form and content. 
The catechist, impersonal style of Ithaca finally presents a first step towards 
timelessness that is finally achieved in Penelope, but is not yet complete at this 
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point. The chapter is still assigned an hour of the day (2 a.m. in the Gilbert 
schema) and a certain degree of plot movement is palpable. Although the 
questions evoke answers that clearly prolong the narrative time, the section 
seems at the same time to be completely void and bereft of time. Instead of a 
linear discourse, the chapter is broken up into numerous small pieces, thus once 
again emphasising the succession of events rather than their simultaneity. This 
chapter in a way prepares Molly’s interior monologue in Penelope by hinting at 
the timeless nature of the imminent free-flowing flux of thoughts that is about to 
break loose. 
Although the topic of endings is a prominent feature throughout Ulysses, 
only the most striking examples and chapters can be analysed in this thesis for 
reasons of length. I have chosen the chapters Proteus, Hades, Aeolus and 
Penelope in order to show the gradual development in the complexity of style 
and in the treatment of this issue.  
3.1.1 Proteus 
In Proteus, when Stephen Dedalus’s thoughts are recorded in all their 
incoherence and impenetrability, the reader encounters an alleged 
incongruence between discourse time and narrative time for the first time in the 
text. It seems as if Joyce manages to slow down time in order to capture and 
savour every single thought within one moment. In the course of the text, there 
are only two full-length chapters featuring interior monologue, the 
aforementioned Proteus chapter, and Penelope. Both these instances of “telling 
from the inside” (Lewis 121) feature grammatical lapses and ellipses, which are 
typical of spontaneous, not thoroughly developed thoughts.14 Although the 
interior monologue is not yet as radically developed as in Penelope, since the 
flow of thoughts is interrupted by other voices at times, and the narrator is still 
present at various points (e.g. “Stephen closed his eyes to hear his boots crush 
crackling wrack and shells.” [37.10], to name just one), it does serve as a 
means of conveying Stephen’s immediate, uncensored thoughts at the very 
moment they are conceived. Stephen’s ideas are not connected in a linear 
fashion, leading logically from one argument to the next, but rather they seem to 
                                                 
14 This topic will be expanded on when dealing with the narrative structure of Proteus.  
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“melt […] into one another”, just as Bergson suggests with regard to pure 
duration (100). 
One of the chapter’s main themes is time and space, on a philosophical level 
with regard to Stephen’s musings about Aristotle and the chapter’s main art, 
philology,15 but also on a subtler, underlying level with regard to structure. 
On the story level, Stephen’s mind is very much focused on time, especially 
in connection with his own mortality and human mortality in general. One of the 
big discrepancies in this chapter lies in Stephens “[persistent resentment of] his 
existence as matter”16 and his eventual acceptance of the fact that his life will, 
at some point, come to an end. On a philosophical level, his struggle can be 
seen as representative of the mind-body dichotomy, but also Stephen’s initial 
denial of corporeality can be interpreted as a denial of teleology (in the 
manifestation of bodily decay).  
At the beginning of Proteus, Stephen is concerned with matters of the visible 
and the audible, but also with matters of time and space:  
A very short space of time through very short times of space. Five, six: 
the nacheinander. Exactly: and that is the ineluctable modality of the 
audible. Open your eyes. No. Jesus! If I fell over a cliff that beetles o’er 
his base, fell through the nebeneinander ineluctably. I am getting on 
nicely in the dark. (37.11-15) 
The notions of nacheinander and nebeneinander are commonly held to be 
references to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s Laokoön,17 suggesting that 
nacheinander (“one after another”) applies to time and nebeneinander (“side by 
side”) to space as a further consequence. However, although time is so readily 
associated with succession, Stephen does not accept the ineluctable 
nacheinander of time and therefore the transience of human life at first, but 
rather seeks refuge in the circular image of eternity on the one hand (“Am I 
walking towards eternity along Sandymount strand?” [37.18], “and ever shall be, 
world without end” [38.3]) and the teleological idea of original creation on the 
other hand (“Creation from nothing” [38.11], “Put me on to Edenville” [38.14-
15]“). Both of these notions are depicted in highly religious imagery and seem to 
allude to the religious education Stephen received in A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man. Another religious motif that recurs throughout Joyce’s work is that 
                                                 
15 cf. Gilbert and Linati schemata. 
16 Jeri Johnson,  Explanatory Notes to Ulysses, p. 784.  
17 cf. e.g. Jeri Johnson p. 784. 
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of Adam and Eve: “Spouse and helpmate of Adam Kadmon: Heva, naked Eve” 
(38.16). In Stephen’s eyes, Adam and Eve are not only a symbol of God’s 
creation, but also of the Fall. Both in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, this symbol 
is connotated both positively (in the sense of genealogical continuity) and 
negatively (due to the aspect of original sin). This discrepancy is invoked in the 
mentioning of “Adam Kadmon” and “Heva”, the prelapsarian names of Adam 
and Eve18, while hinting at their postlapsarian names in the same phrase. All of 
these elements are finally united in the phrase “from everlasting to everlasting 
Womb of sin” (38.18-19).  
From these considerations it follows that the refuge Stephen seeks in both 
the teleological (creation) and the cyclic concepts (eternity) of religious 
discourse cannot be granted to him, since for Stephen, these concepts are 
tainted with the idea of original sin from the very moment they come into being.  
Another cycle present throughout Proteus is that of life and death. Similarly to 
the aforementioned example of Adam and Eve, rather than being introduced 
individually, these two elements are always presented in relation to each other. 
On a narratological level, the symbols of life and death succeed each other very 
quickly, which results in one single image of life and death together, stressing 
their inseparability:  
Mrs. Florence Mac Cabe, relict of the late Patk MacCabe, deeply 
lamented, of Bride Street. […] Creation from nothing. What has she in the 
bag? A misbirth with a trailing navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool. The 
cords of all link back, strandentwining cable of all flesh. […] Aleph, alpha: 
nought, nought, one. (38.8-14) 
Indeed the opposed images of life on the one hand (“Creation”, “misbirth”, 
“navelcord”) and death and decay (“relict”, “late”, “lamented”, “misbirth”) on the 
other hand fulfil an act of “strandentwining” in this passage. The strongest effect 
in this respect is achieved by the word “misbirth”, which combines birth and 
death in a single mental image. Another noteworthy element in this passage is 
Joyce’s use of “nothing” and “nought”. While in the first case, it belongs to a 
phrase describing the act of creation as seen in a religious context, in the 
second case it forms part of a line of thought that can again be interpreted as a 
teleological transgression from “Aleph, alpha” (the beginning) to the end (the 
first letter of “one” can be read as Omega, but also as a representation of 
                                                 
18 cf. Jeri Johnson, p. 785. 
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“zero”, i.e. “nothing”). Thus, “nought” can be read as a symbol of the 
abovementioned act of creation from nothing on the one hand, if the phrase is 
read as “[from] nought [to] one”, but also as a symbol of the ultimate end 
(“[from] alpha [to] nought”) in accordance with the reading of “one” as Omega or 
as zero. Interestingly enough, the doubling of “nought” introduces once more an 
idea of circularity, since the same word represents the end and the beginning 
(creation). The seemingly paradoxical mergence of opposites is present 
throughout Joyce’s work and especially prominent in Finnegans Wake, where 
the motif of Alpha and Omega is also used and transfigured on various 
occasions. In the case of Proteus, this paradox can be resolved by the 
consideration that although human time is seen as teleological in Christianity, it 
is still part of the grand scheme of eternal time, which is believed to be 
everlasting and cyclical in nature, just as Plato suggests in Timaeus.19   
Although there are various other occasions in Proteus where the opposing 
aspects of eternity and mortality are discussed or hinted at (e.g. “Houses of 
decay” [40.4], “Schluss. He laps” [41.31] – here, the Fall equals the end (of 
innocence), “Weak wasting hand on mine” [44.9]), it is only towards the actual 
ending of the chapter that they become more prominent again and form a more 
or less comprehensible train of thought: 
His shadow lay over the rocks as he bent, ending. Why not endless till 
the farthest star? Darkly they are there behind this light, darkness shining 
in the brightness, delta of Cassiopeia, worlds. Me sits there with his 
augur’s rod of ash, in borrowed sandals, by day beside a livid sea, 
unbeheld, in violet night walking beneath a reign of uncouth stars. I throw 
this ended shadow from me, manshape ineluctable, call it back. Endless, 
would it be mine, form of my form? Who watches me here? Who ever 
anywhere will read these written words? (48.3-9) 
At this point in Proteus, the atmosphere has become even gloomier than in the 
initial passages of the chapter and Stephen’s thoughts are ruled by darkness 
(“Darkly”, “darkness”, “night”), which, as a symbol of uncertainty and possible 
danger, is set in opposition to the “light” and “brightness” of eternity. Once 
again, the distinction between the “ending” body and the “endless” soul is 
picked up. Stephen regrets that his body cannot be “endless till the farthest star” 
and denies his own corporeality and mortality. As a result, he “throw[s] this 
                                                 
19 To complicate matters even further, “alpha, nought, nought: one” could be read as an acronym of 
“anno” (domini), which would reinforce the idea of the birth of Christ as the ultimate beginning. 
Moreover, Christ himself is often referred to as “Alpha and Omega” in Christian theology. 
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ended shadow from [him]”, but finally has to accept that “manshape” is 
“ineluctable” and “call […] back” his shadow.20 Finally having acknowledged that 
he cannot escape his body, which is subject to decay and death, he calls on his 
soul (“form of my form”), which indeed was seen as eternal and therefore 
endless in classic philosophy.21 Stephen therefore finally accepts the finiteness 
and teleology of human time, but only in connection with a hope for the 
everlasting quality of his soul. The following consideration in Stephen’s interior 
monologue, although seemingly unconnected with the preceding one, is actually 
a continuation of it: Stephen is wondering who will read the “scribbled words” 
(48.2) he wrote earlier on, reinforcing his hope that his soul will survive him and 
that he will be remembered. As an artist, Stephen naturally believes in the 
power of art to make its creator immortal. However, contrary to usual notions of 
this concept, Stephen’s belief serves as a means of reassurance and is of an 
almost obsessive nature in this chapter, as well as in Portrait. 
The last two sentences of the passage (“Who watches me here? Who ever 
anywhere will read these written words?”), just as the whole section, can also 
be interpreted on the level of metafictionality and self-reference, as Udaya 
Kumar suggests: 
The monologue commences by ‘Why not endless…’. It is triggered off by 
the ‘ending’ introduced by the narrative. It appears as if Stephen is 
reading the very written words of the narrative. This could be related to 
‘read these written words’ at the end of the passage. (68) 
Although I generally agree with Kumar on this point, I am not fully convinced of 
his use of the term “narrative”, since the inner monologue forms part of the 
narrative as a whole in my opinion, even though it might not be part of the 
narrative voice in Proteus. Kumar then claims that the opposition of “corporeal 
being” as “finite” and the soul, or “interiority” as endless “reproduces the 
distinction between the narration that depicts the external states and events and 
the monologue that presents an interior discourse” (ibid.) and thus suggests that 
Stephen functions as a mediator between the level of narration and of interior 
monologue, which appear to be strictly separated in this approach at this point. 
Kumar’s final remark on this passage is that “[t]he repetition of the 
                                                 
20 Of course, the meaning of this passage could also be interpreted as Stephen casting a shadow in the 
sunlight, which would once again stress the aspect of transiency.  
21 The most probable source for this discussion is Aristotle’s De Anima, which Stephen alludes to on 
several occasions in Proteus.  
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‘ending’/’endless’ opposition seems to highlight [the equivocation about the 
discursive status of ‘ending’] and destabilize the sharp distinction between 
narration and monologue” (69). While this argument is certainly valid, I would 
argue that especially in Proteus, the narrative voice is not easily distinguishable 
from the interior monologue to start with, since the whole of the chapter is 
narrated in a very subjective and character-oriented way. Besides, Stephen 
does not have to “read […] the very words of the narrative” in order to see his 
shadow and start reflecting on its finiteness. Yet another way of interpreting the 
sentence “His shadow lay over the rocks as he bent, ending” is considering the 
somewhat unexpected addition “ending” as a prelude to the resulting interior 
monologue, or possibly as free indirect speech rather than straightforward, 
linear narration, which would place the sentence closer to the realm of 
unmediated thought and resolve the resulting discrepancy of discourse. 
Moreover, the question “Who ever anywhere will read these written words?” 
seems like a typical playful ambiguity Joyce uses on several occasions 
throughout his work rather than a conscious act of discursive mediation.  
It is noteworthy that Stephen is reflecting on the nature of endings and 
teleology in this passage in the interior monologue itself, which is also located 
towards the ending of the actual chapter in the text. While at the beginning of 
Proteus, Stephen dismisses thoughts of finiteness, and his somewhat escapist 
focus lies on eternity and creation as the ultimate beginning, here he finally 
starts accepting his corporeality, and as a result, his own mortality. There is an 
accumulation of references to the constant passing of time, both in a cyclical 
and in a teleological way, on the last two pages of the chapter as Stephen’s 
thoughts progress in that direction:  
Under the upswelling tide he saw the writhing weeds lift languidly and 
sway reluctant arms, hising up their petticoats, in whispering water 
swaying and upturning coy silver fonds. Day by day: night by night: lifted, 
flooded and let fall. Lord, they are weary: and, whispered to, they sigh.      
(49.19)  
Just like the “tide” is a never-ending cycle that never comes to a standstill, the 
weeds, which are personified in this passage, cannot escape the repetitive 
action of being “lifted, flooded and let fall”, which they are bound to carry out 
“day by day” and “night by night”, “reluctant[ly]”, without ever being able to stop. 
It seems as if cyclical repetition has gained a negative connotation for Stephen 
at this point of the text, as he perceives it as compulsive and inescapable. It is 
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particularly important to note that, just like at the beginning of Proteus, neither 
the concept of circularity nor that of teleology is able to offer solace to Stephen, 
since he views both of them as oppressively inexorable. 
Again, this account is followed by symbols of decay and death and finally a 
passage that once more reunites symbols of life and death: “A corpse rising 
saltwhite from the undertow” (49.28-29), “Bag of corpsegas sopping in foul 
brine” (49.31), “Dead breaths I living breathe, tread dead dust, devour a ruinous 
offal from all dead.” (49.33-34), “the stench of his green grave, his leprous 
nosehole snoring to the sun” (49.35). The notion of “[d]ead breaths I living 
breathe” is a perfect exemplification of the aforementioned mergence of 
opposites into a single image.  
The very last paragraphs of Proteus are characterised by Stephen’s thoughts 
about the aspect of ending in yet another sense of the word, namely the end of 
the day (“To evening lands. Evening will find itself.” [50.6], “Yes, evening will 
find itself in me, without me. All days make their end” [50.7-8]). It seems curious 
that Stephen should be musing about evening at 11 a.m. (cf. Gilbert schema). 
One of the possible motivations for this might be the establishing of a sense of 
connection with the following chapters, despite its alleged disjointedness, most 
of all with Penelope.22 In this context, it is also interesting to note that the very 
last paragraph of Proteus, albeit showing Stephen’s perspective, is told by the 
narrator and does not form part of the interior monologue, which might suggest 
a further adaptation to the relatively linear narrative style of the following 
chapter: “He turned his face over a shoulder, rere regardant. Moving through 
the air high spars of a threemaster, her sails brailed up on the crosstrees, 
homing, upstream, silently moving, a silent ship” (50.22-24).  
Another noteworthy aspect present in this quotation is the mentioning of 
“silent”, since Stephen associates the audible with time by linking it to the 
nacheinander (Johnson 784). The ship can also be read as a metaphor of 
Stephen himself, who watches it (alluding to the visible, or nebeneinander), but 
is at the same time himself “homing, upstream” and “silently moving”, for he 
does not utter a single word in Proteus, but merely wanders (or “moves”) along 
Sandymount strand. In this case, the audible becomes silent and signifies a 
denial of time on Stephen’s side, subtly suggesting that he has not genuinely 
                                                 
22 I shall discuss the connection between Proteus and Penelope in 3.1.4 Penelope.  
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accepted the implications of his corporeality completely. This claim can also be 
supported with regard to the narrative structure and style in Proteus.   
The most striking stylistic feature of this chapter is certainly the interior 
monologue, which is mostly characterised by accumulations of nouns and 
adjectives rather than verbs and full sentences, which function as a 
representation of a rapid succession of images with which the character is trying 
to cope: “Signatures of all things I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrack, 
the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs” 
(37.1-2). Interior monologue appears to be a very apt technique for conveying 
the Modernist experience of time in all its rapidity and accelerated pace. Joyce’s 
use of interior monologue, especially at this stage of the novel, has various 
implications. Firstly, due to the mere fact that a very limited, subjective point of 
view is offered rather than an objective account of events, there is a special 
emphasis on the individual experience of one single character, while the others 
are completely excluded and the reader only learns what the other characters 
were doing at that point in retrospect, or not at all. Secondly, not only does the 
chapter give a mere snapshot account of a single character’s thoughts, but 
these thoughts are fragmented and disconnected themselves, both semantically 
and, on the level of representation, grammatically. While purely logical, 
straightforwardly thought-through examinations about art, which are typical of 
Stephen’s character in Portrait, could be associated with teleology, Stephen’s 
thoughts in Proteus (and indeed in most of Ulysses), being only loosely 
connected by a merely associative nexus, do not fulfil this criterion. Moreover, 
the very technique of interior monologue itself provides an additional aspect of 
conceptual openness due to the fact that Stephen’s thoughts have not suddenly 
stopped simply because the chapter is at an end and the reader stops “read[ing] 
these written words” as the narrative focus zooms out of the interior perspective 
(nor, for that matter, have they just begun at the point that the reader enters the 
scene); instead, they are an ongoing process lasting throughout the character’s 
life. Even though that life will eventually end at some point, the character’s 
thoughts themselves are certainly not concluded at the discussed point in the 
text.   
Although the story level suggests an acknowledgement of mortality and the 
teleology of time on Stephen’s side, Joyce manages to undermine this 
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seemingly straightforward claim, as well as the belief in a single, definitive 
interpretation with the help of association and structure. Similar tendencies can 
be observed with regard to Penelope, with which the present chapter has more 
in common than meets the eye at first.  
3.1.2 Hades  
As the whole chapter takes place on the way to and at Glasnevin cemetery, 
where the characters attend Patrick Dignam’s funeral, it is not surprising that 
Bloom’s thoughts are mainly circling around the topic of life and death. Similarly 
to Stephen in Proteus, although on a much more bodily and down-to-earth level 
and with an altogether different line of argument and outcome, Bloom also 
considers the two to be an inseparable unity rather than two separate elements. 
Bloom’s first reflection on death is triggered off by Simon Dedalus’s mentioning 
of his son Stephen:  
Noisy selfwilled man. Full of his son. He is right. Something to hand on. If 
only little Rudy had lived. See him grow up. Hear his voice in the house. 
Walking beside Molly in an Eton suit. My son. Me in his eyes. […] Must 
have been that morning in Raymond terrace she was at the window, 
watching the two dogs at it by the wall of the cease to do evil. She had 
that cream gown on with the rip she never stitched. Give us a touch, 
Poldy. God, I’m dying for it. How life begins. (86.9-17)  
At this point, Bloom is thinking about the death of his son Rudy and the more 
general theme of paternal legacy (“Something to hand on”, “Me in his eyes”), 
which was denied to him due to the untimely death of his son in infancy.23 
Immediately after lamenting his son’s death and wishing that he was still alive, 
his thoughts turn to Rudy’s conception, thus once again suggesting a 
reunification of the opposing concepts of life and death. Moreover, Bloom’s 
thoughts about Molly, as well as the very last sentence of this particular train of 
thoughts (“How life begins”) do not merely constitute an act of impropriety in 
terms of respect for Dignam, considering that the interior monologue is taking 
place at the graveyard, but they are also set in juxtaposition to the actual 
location itself and its implications of death and decay. It is also noteworthy that 
Bloom’s train of thoughts is presented in an anti-chronological order, thus 
completely reversing the teleological passing of time.  
                                                 
23 Father and son relationships, albeit being an integral part of Ulysses, unfortunately cannot be discussed 
at greater length in this thesis.  
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Throughout the chapter, Bloom’s thoughts are dominated by set phrases in 
connection with death and funerals (e.g. “Aged 88 after a long and tedious 
illness. […] On whose soul Sweet Jesus have mercy.” [88.19-20]). Since 
Bloom’s profession is that of an advertising agent, it is not surprising that these 
rather impersonal statements, sounding as if they come straight out of a 
newspaper, are present in his thoughts amidst more personal and emotional 
ones (as represented in the previous quote). Most of his considerations are 
triggered off by his immediate environment, and some result from the interaction 
with other characters, such as the following one: 
– As decent a little man as ever wore a hat, Mr Dedalus said. He went 
very suddenly.  
– Breakdown, Martin Cunningham said. Heart. […] He had a sudden 
death, poor fellow, he said.  
– The best death, Mr Bloom said. Their wide open eyes looked at him.  
– No suffering, he said. A moment and all is over. Like dying in sleep.  
No-one spoke.  
Dead side of the street this. […] Foundation stone for Parnell. 
Breakdown. Heart. (92.14-28) 
In this passage, Bloom’s thoughts are prompted by Martin Cunningham’s 
explanation of Dignam’s death (“Breakdown. […] Heart”). Although Bloom’s 
thoughts take a turn from the initial consideration towards the actual spatial 
environment, they revolve in a cyclical fashion and end on the same note as the 
initial impulse given by Cunningham (“Breakdown. Heart”). The actual cause of 
death is also of particular importance with regard to teleology and endings, 
since the described “[b]reakdown” puts a very unexpected and sudden end to a 
human life, thus reaching the envisioned goal of its teleological drive not by 
constant, controlled progress, but rather in a single, random moment. The 
notion of “breakdown” serves as an exemplification of the relentless power of 
teleology on the one hand, but also of its arbitrariness and the fact that 
Dignam’s death is not necessarily part of a grander scheme, which would 
perhaps render it meaningful, but rather a mere act of coincidence, which 
nobody can predict or prevent. The general circular tendency of the interior 
monologues in Ulysses, and especially those delivered by Bloom, has already 
been discussed by Udaya Kumar in connection with Lestrygonians:  
‘Provost’s house. The reverend Dr Salmon : tinned salmon. Well tinned in 
there. Wouldn’t live in it if they paid me.’ [Ulysses 157.11-12] The 
‘Provost’s House’ leads to an evocation of his name. This further leads to 
‘tinned salmon’, but the ‘tinned’ leads back to a consideration of the 
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house again. In this passage, the topic of discourse seems to be moving 
in a circle. (50) 
I would argue that in this case, the circularity of Bloom’s thoughts stands in 
(conscious or subconscious) juxtaposition with the rather bleak and 
destructively teleological overall tone of Hades, with which Bloom is trying to 
cope.24 
The constant repetition of motifs (the opposition of life as the ultimate 
beginning and death as the ultimate end) is not only present on the story level in 
Bloom’s thoughts, but also on the discourse level via the excessive use of 
“‘deadly’ verbal nuances” (Johnson 803), or rather nuisances in some cases 
(“Priests dead against it”, “He gazed gravely at the ground” etc.), which suggest 
a somewhat obsessive circularity. This idea also corresponds to the Homeric 
parallel, where Odysseus meets “Sisyphus heaving his stone [and] Tityus, a 
character who, like Prometheus, is condemned to an eternity of having his liver 
plucked at by vultures” (Johnson 802) in Hades. Both Homeric characters are 
mentioned in the Linati scheme, while Gilbert only gives the equivalent of 
“Sisyphus: Cunningham”. Thus, the circularity first introduced as a reassuring 
counterpart to the negatively connotated teleological implications of the 
graveyard turns into a compulsive repetition of sorts. It is not so much the dead 
which Bloom pities, but the living, especially the bereaved (like himself), since 
they are the ones who have to cope with the consequences of their beloved 
one’s death over and over again, while death, according to Bloom, means “[n]o 
suffering” for the deceased – “[a] moment and all is over”. Although this 
statement seems somewhat egotistical and inappropriate at first glance, it 
becomes understandable in view of Bloom’s father’s suicide and Rudy’s 
premature death. On a similar note, Bloom considers it “[m]ore sensible to 
spend money on some charity for the living” (108.35) instead of using it for the 
upkeep of graves or for organising funerals. 
The last pages of Hades are characterised by Bloom’s musings on the topic 
of memory and its counterpart, forgetting: “Begin to be forgotten. Out of sight, 
out of mind” (107.15). As a solution for the latter aspect, he briefly considers the 
                                                 
24 Interestingly enough, the example chosen by Kumar, albeit stemming from an altogether different 
context, also features a merging of life and death in the single image of the salmon, which is first referred 
to as “Reverend Salmon”, but consecutively proclaimed “tinned”, i.e. dead. For an exploration of the 
metaphor of the salmon as a way of establishing continuity and circularity, cf. Vicki Mahaffey’s lecture 
“Finn Again: Huck Finn, Finn MacCool & the Salmon; The Irish-American Odyssey of Finnegans 
Wake”, delivered at the James Joyce Summer School in Dublin, July 2010.   
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use of a gramophone, which would enable the living to remember their 
deceased relatives and friends: “Besides how could you remember everybody? 
Eyes, walk, voice. Well, the voice, yes: gramophone. […] Remind you of the 
voice like the photograph reminds you of the face” (109.28-32). It is interesting 
to note the medial shift inherent in this aspect, which is not only taking place 
from the visible (“photograph”) to the audible (“gramophone”), thus maybe 
subtly alluding to Proteus, but also from the static medium of photography to 
one that is more apt at capturing not simply one single moment in time, but a 
series of moments, or a longer time span in general. Moreover, the gramophone 
allows for a sense of simultaneity if more than one voice is involved.25 
Interestingly enough, the only one of the three aspects mentioned (“[e]yes, 
walk, voice”) Bloom does not remark on further is how to remember the walk of 
a specific person. While Joyce could probably have been aware and even 
familiar with new approaches to photography and painting directed at depicting 
movement, such as the works of Eadweard Muybridge (whom he must have 
acknowledged at least for his strikingly pun-like name), or Marcel Duchamp’s 
œuvre (and Nude descending a staircase26 in particular), Bloom is apparently 
not aware of this technique, or at least does not think of it in that particular 
moment. In the second case, this might be explained due to the fact that the 
painting did not exist in 1904, but this fact does not explain Bloom’s ignorance 
towards Muybridge, whose creative period dates back as far as the 19th century. 
Therefore, this non-mentioning can be read as a social marker of his less 
intellectual background in contrast to Stephen Dedalus, but also of his general 
aversion towards metaphysical and scientific matters (represented by Stephen) 
in favour of empiricism and his association with the bodily sphere rather than 
with overly abstract theoretical problems throughout the text.  
In a way, Bloom’s thoughts can be read as a somewhat more pragmatic 
addition to Stephen’s belief in the eternal quality of art and its power of 
                                                 
25 Of course, both the appearance and the actual usage of a gramophone record represent a cyclical 
appearance and movement respectively. However, the fact that the record has two sides, which have to be 
turned in order for the music to keep playing, suggests an aspect of pause rather than a seamless 
transgression.  
26 Marcel Duchamp: Nu descandant un escalier no. 2. 1912. (current location: Philadephia Museum of 
Art). This painting not only captures one single moment in time (that of the descent), but also unites 
several movements within that one moment into a single image, as the various stages of the movement 
overlap. Thus, they not only create a sense of teleological movement in a particular direction, but also the 
simultaneity of the movement itself, creating a sense of continuity and infinity at the same time, since the 
movement never changes and its length (and eventual goal) is only determined by the materialistic 
parameters of the canvas.  
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preserving the memory of a human being expressed in Proteus. While 
Stephen’s solution is (or rather: must be) a chiefly abstract and intellectual one, 
Bloom displays a more down-to-earth approach to this matter. Rather than 
seeking artistic transfiguration, he is interested in a direct mimetic 
representation of the voice and the person, respectively. 
Bloom’s very last thoughts at the graveyard blur the line between life and 
death even further, although he means to leave the place behind once and for 
all and get “[b]ack to the world again” (110.23). Apparently, this attempt is 
bound to fail due to the cyclical interconnection between life and death alluded 
to throughout Hades, and, on a grander scale, in all of Ulysses: 
Enough of this place. Brings you a bit nearer every time. […] Poor papa 
too. […] I will appear to you after death. You will see my ghost after 
death. My ghost will haunt you after death. There is another world after 
death named hell. I do not like that other world she wrote. No more do I. 
Plenty to see and hear and feel yet. Feel live warm beings near you. Let 
them sleep in their maggoty beds. They are not going to get me this 
innings. Warm beds: warm fullblooded life. (110.23)  
This passage articulates Bloom’s fears of his own mortality that he naturally 
experiences in a particularly strong manner at the cemetery. Although he is 
determined to leave the place and its implications of death and decay behind, 
he does acknowledge that it “[b]rings you a bit nearer every time”. His 
mentioning of “ghost”s also draws a connection between the life of the bereaved 
and the dead, suggesting that he is not able to mentally draw a line between his 
own and the “other world”. Bloom wants to experience and feel everything he 
possibly can in the “lease of life” (105.14) he has left, as he believes there is still 
“[p]lenty to see and hear and feel”. This train of thoughts ends on a particularly 
positive reaffirmation of life (“Warm beds: warm fullblooded life”) that is 
juxtaposed with the “maggoty beds” of the dead.    
Just like in Proteus, the concept of cyclicality is seen as ambivalent. While 
Bloom, not unlike Stephen, applies thoughts of circularity as a kind of coping 
strategy for the grim overall atmosphere of death and finality in Hades, it is 
never free from the connotation of enduring and suffering in a Sisyphus-like 
way. Only in the conceptual merging of death and new life, as exemplified in the 
following thought, as well as in Bloom’s initial thoughts about Rudy’s conception 
and birth, a positive re-evaluation of the cyclical concept is carried out: “The 
Botanic Gardens are just over there. It’s the blood sinking in the earth gives new 
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life” (104.26-27). In this respect, “[b]oth ends meet” (104.16) indeed in Bloom’s 
mind, where “[i]n the midst of death we are in life” (104.15).   
3.1.2 Aeolus 
In Aeolus, the reader is presented with a concept of time altogether different 
from the preceding chapters. Several different voices are laid out through the 
medium of the newspaper, creating a sense of simultaneity, the “intersection of 
time and space" (Bergson 100). Indeed newspapers were seen as “the present 
in its totality” or as “simultaneous poetry” at the beginning of the 20th century 
(Kern 70). However, while the newspaper might provide various parts of 
information at once, the very act of reading it is not simultaneous any more, 
since the individual articles cannot be read at the same time. Time in this 
chapter appears very condensed, the newspaper displays an almost imagist 
conciseness, and different voices seem to be cut off without having had the 
chance to develop further. Like many Modernist texts, Aeolus (and, indeed, 
Ulysses itself) presents a very fragmented and snapshot-like view of events. 
The newspaper cuttings are semantically very much connected to and serve as 
a mirror image of a given present moment through language; they are not 
timeless, but rather serve as a demonstration of the ephemeral nature of the 
present. As soon as new events happen in the outer world, newspapers 
become out of date, thus this chapter can also be read as challenging the 
possibility of representing reality through language. In fact, simultaneity in a 
broader sense can also be discovered in the whole of Ulysses itself, since form 
and content are inseparably interlinked. 
The style of Aeolus appears to be modelled on newspapers, since bold, 
upper-case headlines dominate its form. However, its textual body is not that of 
a newspaper article, but rather it presents the reader with a relatively 
straightforward narrative (as far as any part of Ulysses can be considered 
“straightforward”). The realm of the newspaper, exemplified in the 
aforementioned use of headlines, but also in the frequent allusions to the actual 
machinery behind the press, provides the general setting for the narrative, and 
is also reflected upon in the actual narrative itself. 
The chapter starts out with an account of the fast-paced “HEART OF THE 
HIBERNIAN METROPOLIS” (112.1):  
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Before Nelson’s pillar trams slowed, shunted, changed trolley started for 
Blackrock, Kingstown and Dalkey, Clonskea, […] Harold’s Cross. […] 
Right and left parallel clanging ringing a double-decker and a singledeck 
moved from their railheads, swerved to the down line, glided parallel. 
(112.2-10)  
The focus of this initial passage lies on the urbanisation of Dublin, which was 
certainly also a characterising topic of newspapers from that time, exemplified 
by the accumulative mentioning of public transportation (“trams”, “trolley”, 
“double-decker”, “singledeck”, “railheads”, “glided parallel”). Another element 
present here is that of the increase in velocity brought about by modernised and 
industrialised life, as expressed by the quick succession of verbs (“slowed, 
shunted, changed […] started”, “swerved”) and the somewhat impressionist 
onomatopoetic description of the busses’ movement as “clanging” and “ringing”.  
Similarly, the printing machinery is described as an ever-moving force, 
without ever coming to a halt, or a standstill. The frequent use of onomatopoeia, 
such as “Thumping, thumping.” (114.10-11), “Thumping, thump.” (114.20) and 
“Sllt” (117) in the midst of otherwise perfectly grammatical sentences 
strengthens the sense of inescapability and omnipresence of a strong forward 
drive in this context. This issue is openly discussed towards the beginning of 
Aeolus: “Machines. Smash a man to atoms if they got him caught. Rule the 
world today. [Dignam’s] machineries are pegging away too. Like these, got out 
of hand: fermenting. Working away, tearing away. And that old grey rat tearing 
to get in” (114.21-24). The parallelisation of machines with human life, and in 
this case death, reintroduces the ever-present discussion of the unavoidability 
of death and the inexorable teleological drive of life. However, once again, this 
drive is seen in connection with “fermenting”, i.e. re-cycling, which blurs the 
boundaries between life and death once more and links them even more 
closely. In a way, the constant repetition, reiteration and transformation of this 
topic on various levels and occasions in the text presents yet another 
exploration of cyclicality on a metapoetic level.   
The aforementioned topic of industrialisation and machinery is taken up at 
various points in the chapter, always in connection with their unstoppability and 
never-ending, merciless movement. While this aspect is merely alluded to in 
most of the passages, the following quote contains a direct examination of it:  
The machines clanked in threefour time. Thump, thump, thump. Now if 
he got paralysed there and no one knew how to stop them they’d clank 
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on and on the same, print it over and over and up and back. 
Monkeydoodle the whole thing. Want a cool head. (115.9-12) 
Interestingly enough, the rhythm of the printing press is first compared to the 
metre of a musical piece (“in threefour time”). As the most common type of 
dance in three-four time would be a waltz, this mentioning could further 
implicate a circular movement. In any case, the deliberate association with the 
realm of music presents a somewhat playful and light-hearted transformation of 
the negatively connotated notion of the relentless movement exemplified by the 
printing press. However, Bloom’s thoughts do revert to that aspect soon 
enough, when he is considering the possibility of the editor Myles Crawford 
becoming “paralysed”. This time, the impossibility of the machinery coming to a 
standstill is addressed directly (“they’d clank on and on the same, print it over 
and over and up and back”) and juxtaposed to the imagined paralysis of the 
human editor. It is of particular importance that in this case, the machine’s 
movement is not only never-ending and compulsively circular in nature, but also 
highly repetitive (“on and on the same”) and unproductive as far as its outcome 
is concerned. In effect, its result amounts to a testimonial of the highly 
destructive power of the inescapable, ceaseless drive of the press machinery 
and, as a further consequence, of industrialisation itself, which does not allow 
the human being to stop or take a break, but forces and chases him on 
incessantly. Contrary to previous allusions to cyclicality and teleology, for the 
first time the reader is presented with a sort of circular teleology that, albeit 
being aimed at a certain goal by definition (the actual release of the next issue), 
manages to lose this goal at the same time, thus turning into meaningless 
repetition rather than a straightforward progression towards an ending.27 In fact, 
the movement of the machine develops into a certain kind of paralysis with 
regard to its result, while at the same time symbolising infinite movement, since 
it does not produce a coherent, teleologically oriented newspaper article, but a 
large amount of randomly generated “Monkeydoodle” of questionable content 
and textual affiliation instead.28  
                                                 
27 Dieter Fuchs alerted me to the idea that the printing press itself resembles both a teleological and a 
cyclical movement, as the paper keeps rolling on in the same direction, but also from a bigger roll of 
paper itself. Moreover, the barrel of the printing press also revolves in a circular fashion. 
28 Perhaps this mentioning can also be read as an allusion to the Infinite Monkey Theorem, which 
suggests that a monkey randomly hitting keys of a typewriter for an infinite amount of time will “almost 
certainly” generate a given text (the suggested example is Shakespeare’s Complete Works). While the 
chance of a monkey actually producing a coherent text in this way is very small, it does not equal zero. In 
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On many more occasions, there is talk about “the obedient reels feeding in 
huge webs of paper” (116.7-8). Again, the characteristic sound of clanking is 
mentioned: “Clank it. Clank it.” (116.8). This time, the afterlife of the newspaper 
is also considered, introducing once again its connection to the cycle of life and 
death mentioned in the beginning: “Miles of it unreeled. What becomes of it 
after? O, wrap up meat, parcels: various uses, thousand and one things” 
(116.8-10). In this case, an interesting transformation of this aspect occurs in 
the act of the recycling of the newspaper for “various uses”. By that act, the 
outdated (i.e. “dead”) newspaper is offered a “new lease of life” (105.14) in 
another function. Of course, this passage also alludes to Bloom’s own 
secondary use of the newspaper in Calypso (“He took up a page from the pile of 
cut sheets [at the butchers]” [57.12], “He tore away half the prize story sharply 
and wiped himself with it” [67.22]). Even at this very bodily level of the text, 
there is a clear distinction between the “kidney ooz[ing] bloodgouts on the 
willlowpatterned dish” (57.3), which is described in very lively and vivid terms 
albeit technically being dead meat, and also paralleled with Bloom’s erotic 
fantasy about the “nextdoor girl” (57.4) and Bloom’s act of defecation, probably 
of that very same kidney, significantly enough taking place at the very end of 
the chapter. Again, a sense of (re)cyclicality is achieved through the mediating 
device of the newspaper, while at the same time a certain amount of finality is 
hinted at by the fact that even the kidney’s secondary use as food has 
eventually come to an end (although, to complicate the matter even furtoher, it 
could theoretically also be used as dung).  
The telling headline “ORTHOGRAPHICAL” (117.1) features a self-reflexive 
account of the act of typesetting, highlighting its mistakes: “Want to be sure of 
his spelling. Proof fever. […] It is amusing to view the unpar one ar alleled 
embarra two ars is it? double ss ment of a harassed pedlar while gauging au 
the symmetry of a peeled pear under a cemetery wall” (117.1-6). While these 
mistakes are mostly “amusing”, they also create a sort of disturbance in the flow 
of information and especially in that of reading. While these errors can probably 
be said to originate from human blunders, as the passage continues, the 
                                                                                                                                               
the context of Aeolus, this reference to “Monkeydoodle” might imply that even though the machine is 
simply “doodling” on and inserting random letters, it might actually generate a coherent text, which 
would mean that although the generation of the text lacks an intention and a teleological drive, the 
eventual outcome is satisfactory. 
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faultiness of the actual machinery becomes apparent and the interjections 
become more intrusive: “Sllt. The nethermost deck of the first machine jogged 
forward its flyboard with sllt the first batch of quirefold papers. Sllt. Almost 
human the way it sllt to call attention. Doing its level best to speak. That door 
too sllt creaking, asking to be shut. Everything speaks in its own way. Sllt” 
(117.10-14). Although on the story level, Bloom is reflecting on the actual sound 
of the machines and their “[a]lmost human” quality of attempting to attract 
attention, on the discourse level it must be considered that from a formal point 
of view, the genre of the text is supposed to be a newspaper article. Therefore, 
the mistakes not only disrupt the flow of the text, but also its very function – that 
of presenting information in a linear fashion.  
A possible explanation for this apparent reluctance towards machines could 
be that Bloom himself does not approve of the significant acceleration of the 
pace of human life caused by industrialisation. On another occasion, “[a] heavy 
tram honking its gong” (71.28), as yet another symbol of the aforementioned 
rapid change, prevents Bloom from watching a woman across the street with 
silk stockings enter a car, which might have given him the opportunity to have a 
closer look at them in greater detail. This missed opportunity triggers off the 
following thoughts: “Lost it. Curse your noisy pugnose. Feels locked out of it. 
Paradise and the peri. Always happening like that. The very moment. […] The 
tram passed. They drove off towards the Loop Line bridge, her rich gloved hand 
on the steel grip. Flicker, flicker: the laceflare of her hat in the sun: flicker, flick” 
(71.29-37). It is not only the tram which is pictured in a negative light in this 
passage, but also the car, which is responsible for the woman eventually driving 
away. Bloom is therefore bereft of the opportunity to obey his desires and bodily 
drives by the very embodiments of the unrelenting force of industrialisation (of 
which the printing press is yet another specimen) and openly dismisses them as 
“pugnose”.  
On yet another level, the numerous mistakes and interruptions of the textual 
flow in the aforementioned passage of Aeolus can be read as a disruption of a 
straightforward teleology of the text, which also seems to be one of the major 
aims of Ulysses itself. The straightforward style of a newspaper is literally blown 
away by the “hot air” (Johnson 809) of its rhetoric in Aeolus, as the Homeric 
parallel might suggest, as well as in the whole of Ulysses itself, with the effect of 
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an “unsettling of narrative expectations” (Johnson xxxiv). David Hayman was 
the first to introduce the idea of an Arranger present in the text, who seems to 
be especially active in this chapter. He characterises this entity as follows: “the 
arranger should be seen as something between a persona and a function, 
somewhere between the narrator and the implied author” (122). As much as this 
concept seems tempting, since it apparently resolves the problematic 
relationship between author and narrator, which has been discussed on 
numerous occasions with regard to literature for centuries, it simplifies, or even 
overlooks the strikingly high level of self-reflexivity and metafictional comments 
in Ulysses, which do not only relate to an instance present in the text, but also 
comprise the whole of the reader’s and author’s reality lying outside the text (cf. 
Stephen’s “Who anywhere will read these written words?” [48.9], to name just 
one). Rather than making a clear distinction between the role of the author and 
the narrator, Ulysses is a formidable example of a text that blurs and 
consciously plays with binary boundaries on a large number of occasions and 
indeed, intentional ambiguity (on the level of words, as well as that of grammar 
and concept) seems like one of the basic principles around which the novel is 
built. Moreover, Hayman’s narratological approach completely disregards the 
role of the reader, who, in terms of reader response criticism, would in fact be 
regarded as the real arranger of the text.29 Just as Hayman’s arranger “flips 
through the score before tapping his baton to ‘Begin’” (Johnson xxxiii) in Sirens, 
so does the reader flip through the book, deciding where he/she wants to start 
and stop reading, whether he/she desires to skip a few pages, or if he/she 
wants to start reading at the first chapter, in the middle of the book or even on 
the last page. Moreover, the reader is the only instance able to arrive at 
simultaneity through his/her reading. While the author can conceive simultaneity 
and try to make it apparent, it only materialises through the mediation of the 
reader. In the context of Aeolus, the role of the reader and more specifically, of 
the supposed audience of the Freeman’s Journal, is of particular importance, 
since newspapers would be made obsolete without their readers and the 
reading public in general. Although the general style of Aeolus, and the 
abovementioned mechanical disruptions of the text in particular, can certainly 
be described as “a subversive textual force always drawing attention back to 
                                                 
29 Cf. e.g. the works of Wolfgang Iser, Hans-Robert Jauss or C.S. Lewis in particular. 
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Ulysses as a field in which meanings are produced, countered, remade, and 
undone” (ibid.), they might as well assume this function without the mediating 
instance of an arranger.  
In any case, the numerous disruptions of the continuous textual flow caused 
by human mistakes on the one hand, because they cannot keep up with 
mercilessly fast pace of the machinery, but also by the sheer relentless never-
ceasing drive of the printing press itself, present a noteworthy disturbance in the 
context of teleology as well. It seems that the meaningless, circular repetition of 
the printing press stands in the way of teleology, which relies on that very same 
machinery for its actual purpose, the distribution of relevant information.30 
3.1.4 Penelope 
All the chapters of Ulysses are defined by their respective unique art and style, 
which creates a strong correspondence between form and content. However, it 
is not until Penelope that “pure duration” in the sense of Henri Bergson is 
achieved. Not only are the past, the present and even the future united on a 
conceptual level (no hour of the day is assigned to this chapter, its symbol is 
eternity; the interior monologue takes place in the moment between a day ends 
and a new one dawns), but also on a semantic level, since Molly Bloom thinks 
about past lovers, her husband Leopold Bloom as a representation of both the 
present and the past and finally about Stephen Dedalus, which suggests an 
association with the future and, in a wider sense, with genealogy. In this section, 
time has virtually become unbound (as has Molly): her thoughts are “melting […] 
into each other”, her “ego” indeed “lets itself live” and Joyce makes “the past 
and the present states into an organic whole” (Bergson 100) through the 
immediate representation of Molly’s unfiltered, spontaneous flow of thoughts. 
Contrary to the depiction of Stephen’s ideas in Proteus, this chapter lays bare its 
lack of structure and punctuation:  
Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his 
breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he 
used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doin his highness to 
make himself interesting to that old faggot Mrs Riordan […]. (Ulysses 
690.1-4) 
                                                 
30 The faulty typeset in these passages might also ironically allude to the actual printing process of 
Ulysses itself, whose circumstances were described as “exceptional” by Sylvia Beach in the preamble of 
its first edition, asking “the reader’s indulgence for [unavoidable] typographical errors”. 
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There are barely any signs of punctuation that might hinder the stream, which 
becomes more ecstatic with every page.31  
The overall structure of Penelope can certainly be described as cyclical (the 
same topics are taken up over and over again; it starts with an affirmation and 
ends with one: “Yes” (690.1 / 732.22), the first and the last man Molly mentions 
is Leopold Bloom), therefore it creates a sense of an “organic whole” even within 
itself. Yet, at the same time, there is a strong sense of finality and teleology 
toward the actual ending of the chapter. However, contrary to its common 
notion, in this case it does not lead towards a final ending point, but rather back 
to the beginning (not only towards the first word of Penelope, but also towards 
the very first word of Ulysses, as Penelope ends with the letter “s” [“Yes” 
(732.22)] and Ulysses starts with it [“Stately” (1.1)]32).  
While the most striking embodiment of cyclicality is found on a structural and 
conceptual level (also with regard to the Homeric parallel), quite a few 
references to this topic can be found on the story level as well. Ironically 
enough, one of the first thoughts Molly has right at the beginning of the chapter 
is that of “the end of the world” (690.8), but just like Bloom in Hades, she 
dismisses the bleak consequences of this thought and juxtaposes it with an 
affirmation of life by suggesting to “let us have a bit of fun first” (ibid.). Similarly 
to Bloom in Hades, Molly’s interior monologue is characterised by thoughts of 
the cycle of life and death, the transience of human life and the mark a human 
being (and especially a woman) can leave on the world. In this context, she 
considers the use of perfume as a means of preserving a person’s memory, 
which adds an olfactory medium to the ones mentioned in Hades (audible: 
gramophone, visual: photograph): 
weeks and weeks I kept the handkerchief under my pillow for the smell of 
him there was no decent perfume to be got in that Gibraltar only that 
cheap peau despagne that faded and left a stink on you more than 
anything else I wanted to give him a memento he gave me that clumsy 
Claddagh ring for luck that I gave Gardner going to South Africa where 
those Boers killed him with their war and fever (713.4-8) 
The symbolical exchange of a “memento” seems to be the most fervent wish 
uttered by Molly. In this case, this exchange is translated into that of a 
                                                 
31 Hans – Walter Gabler argues that the full stops constitute a structural Möbius strip. (Penelope, the last 
Chapter of Ulysses 47). 
32 This idea was also mentioned by Fritz Senn in his lecture entitled “Alphabetic Dispersion in Ulysses” 
delivered at the James Joyce Summer School in Dublin, July 2010. 
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handkerchief bearing the smell of her lover; however, her own transfer of smell 
is somewhat ridiculed when it becomes “a stink” of “cheap peau despagne”.33 
An aspect that is probably even more problematic than the perfume’s 
unpleasant smell in this context is the “fad[ing]” of the perfume, which would 
imply that the memory would not last very long. As the exchange of smell does 
not seem to render an altogether satisfactory result, Molly’s lover gives her a 
“clumsy Claddagh ring for luck” as a symbol of consistency and solidity, which is 
contrasted with the short-lived shelf life of scent. In an ironic reversal, the very 
same ring that was once intended as a sign of durability (and circularity, both 
due to its form and its general meaning) is connected to death, violence and 
eventual destruction when Molly’s lover is killed by “those Boers […] with their 
war and fever”. While it also seems quite surprising that Molly would give a 
token of her first lover’s affection to another one, it also asserts a certain sense 
of continuity, which is eventually broken up by Gardner’s death.  
In this context, Molly also reminisces about the topic of past lovers in general 
before concluding that “I suppose theyre all dead and rotten long ago” (716.1-2), 
thus metaphorically burying them along with her memories. From this point 
onwards, the only male figures of sexual interest she mentions are Bloom, 
Boylan (as representatives of the present) and Stephen (as a symbol of the 
future). Thus, while the whole chapter is made up of a recount of her past and 
while this fact does not change at this point, she now concentrates on the 
present and the future at the same time.34 
Still focussing on the topic of the teleological drive of human life, Molly also 
juxtaposes her own (relative) youth to the aged appearance of other women: 
“ugly as she was near 80 or 100 her face a mass of wrinkles with all her religion 
domineering” (710.7-8), “I can’t help it if Im young still can I” (727.1), which, in a 
way, might be read as a sort of denial of the destructive aging process which 
she herself will one day undertake. On a similar note, Molly thinks about her 
daughter Milly, who symbolises genealogy and therefore a continuation of 
Molly’s own life through her maternal legacy on the one hand. On the other 
hand however, Milly is also perceived as a competitor in terms of beauty and 
                                                 
33 Molly is apparently not aware of the fact that Roger & Gallet’s “Peau d’Espagne” was a highly 
esteemed and probably everything but “cheap” perfume and even won the Grand Prix in France in 1889. 
(Cf. e.g. Havelock Ellis) 
34 She does briefly think about Rudy, but only in connection with Bloom (728).  
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youthfulness by Molly, who laconically comments on the vanity (both in the 
sense of conceit and of vanitas) of her daughter’s bodily charms: “wanting to put 
her hair up at 15 my powder too only ruin her skin on her shes time enough for 
that all her life after of course shes restless knowing shes pretty with her lips so 
read a pity they wont stay that way I was too” (718.10-12). In this quote, both 
aspects (that of Molly as a caring mother and as a woman jealous of the other 
one’s attractiveness) coincide, as Molly fears that Milly will grow up too soon 
and that the powder Milly uses to imitate her mother might harm or “ruin her 
skin”, claiming that she has “time enough for that” once she is older. At the 
same time, Molly constantly compares herself to her daughter (“I was too”, “I 
was just like that myself” [718.23-24]) and almost maliciously states that it is a 
“pity they wont stay that way”. Again, the image of ruined skin as a sign of decay 
is juxtaposed to the “red lips”, which will, however, also be subject to the 
process of aging eventually. By stating that there is “time enough for that”, Molly 
also seems to attempt to deny the teleology of human time by negating its 
passing and trying to stop Milly from growing older, at least on the level of 
appearance.  
While Milly qualifies as a carrier of Molly and Leopold Bloom’s genetic 
material and therefore as a metaphorical continuation of their own lives,35 
Rudy’s premature death symbolises a failed genealogy. Milly, as a 
representative of the female sex, is therefore associated with continuity and 
cyclicality, while Rudy’s death symbolises the eventual ending point of the 
merciless force of teleology. The female and male principle are associated with 
circularity and teleology respectively throughout Ulysses. Just like Bloom in 
Hades, Molly mourns Rudy’s death in Penelope, but at the same time believes it 
would have been better to save the freshly knitted jacket in which he was buried 
for a (living) child in need: “I oughnt to have buried him in that little woolly jacket 
I knitted crying as I was but give it to some poor child” (728.12-13). This 
particular passage also inverts the Homeric parallel in an ironic way, since in the 
Odyssey, Penelope is knitting a burial robe for her father in law, Laertes 
(Johnson 971), which she keeps unravelling in order not to be pursued by her 
suitors, thus buying time and at the same time seemingly hindering its flow by 
                                                 
35 This topic is elaborated on in Finnegans Wake in the context of ALP and her daughter Issy, especially 
in Book IV. 
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never actually finishing the cloth,36 while here, Molly does complete the action of 
knitting, but in a way wishes she could undo it. However, while Penelope is the 
weaver of her own text(ure) (or, indeed, the mysterious arranger figure?), who 
can control, speed up and slow down the pace of time (or in this case of the 
narrative), Molly cannot undo the force of human teleology as easily in her own 
life due to her being “human, all too human” (Letters 1:160, Selected Letters 
p.287). 
Similarly to the other discussed chapters, Penelope is characterised not only 
by gloomy thoughts about the end of life, but also by more positive ones about 
its beginning, especially in connection with Molly’s strong sense of motherhood 
and womanhood. This aspect is not just limited to her children, but also seen on 
a wider scale, with Molly playing the part of a pre- and posthuman37 mother of 
humanity in general. Like Bloom, she also remembers Rudy’s conception 
immediately before thinking of the aforementioned burial jacket: “it wasn’t my 
fault we came together when I was watching the two dogs up in her behind in 
the middle of the naked street” (728.10-11). A strong sense of cyclicality in the 
context of life and death is palpable throughout Molly’s words, especially in the 
aforementioned passage, or when she muses about “Fanny M Coy […] skinny 
thing with a turn in her eye trying to sing my songs shed want to be born all over 
again” (723.23-24) or claims that “[men are] all mad to get in there where they 
come out of” (711.21-22), which strongly connects the aspect of birth to that of 
conception and reproduction, stressing the never-ending process of both 
metaphorically and physically re-entering the womb (and thereby even possibly 
creating yet another human being).  
Although Molly’s thoughts feature a large amount of cyclical imagery, 
Penelope, in fact, manages to transgress the concepts of both cyclicality and 
teleology altogether and turn it into a discourse of abundance and, as a further 
result, of infinity.38 Molly’s discourse of abundance is structurally perceivable 
through the excessive repetition of certain words and phrases, such as “yes” 
and “O”, while on the conceptual level, similarly to Proteus, Molly’s thoughts 
                                                 
36 Ruben Borg addresses this issue by calling Penelope “the agent of an impossible economy in which 
buying time and wasting time are accomplished as a single gesture” (15). 
37 cf. Joyce’s letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver: “I have rejected the usual interpretation of [Penelope] as a 
human apparition. […] In conception and technique I tried to depict the earth which is prehuman and 
presumably posthuman.” (Letters 1:180, Selected Letters, p. 289) 
38 Ruben Borg makes a stringent and strongly convincing case of the inability to measure time by 
common, necessarily limiting standards in Penelope and Finnegans Wake. 
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continue even though the reader stops reading. Molly herself reflects on the 
never-ending quality of thoughts in Penelope: “it fills up your whole day and life 
always something to think about every moment” (709.29-30). Moreover, the fact 
that Molly is depicted as a character very much focussed on the body in general 
and more specifically on the female body, while at the same time representing 
the rather vaguely defined abstract concept of “the earth” suggests that her 
identity is not - and probably need not be - defined in terms of strictly drawn 
boundaries in the realm of Ulysses.39 Similarly, Molly combines the contrary 
epithets “prehuman” and “posthuman” within herself, which leads to the question 
whether she is subject to the teleology of human life at all or whether she 
actually becomes immortal (Molly Bloom as a character definitely became 
immortal through the mediating instance of literature). This discrepancy, as well 
as the general realm of unboundedness, is playfully alluded to by Molly herself, 
when she juxtaposes the regularity of Mina Purefoys’s regular birth giving 
intervals (“filling her up with a child or twins once a year as regular as the clock” 
694.16) to her own uncontrollable emotional outbreaks:  
I was in fits of laughing with the giggles I couldn’t stop about all my 
hairpins falling on after another with the mass of hair I had youre always 
in great humour she said yes because it grigged her because she knew 
what it meant because I used to tell her a good bit of what went on 
between us not all but just enough to make her month water (695.12-15) 
The implications of laughter as a means of expressing repressed subconscious 
desires and its link to sexuality has been explored and often highlighted by 
Sigmund Freud and Hélène Cixous with opposing arguments and altogether 
different imagery, but essentially similar results.40 Apart from Molly’s laughter, 
which is perceived by her environment in a negative way along with her open 
handling of sexuality (“it grigged her because she knew what it meant”), her hair 
is yet another image that stresses a very bodily focus and depicts Molly as “der 
[sic!] Fleisch, der stets bejaht” (Letters 1:170, Selected Letters, p. 285). It is 
freed from its metaphorical imprisonment by Molly’s unusually strong laughter 
and her (apparently abundant) “mass of hair”. The hairpin can be read as a 
symbol of a cultural code which not only represses female sexuality (which is 
                                                 
39 In Finnegans Wake, the transfiguration of human characters into dead objects is not uncommon, but in 
Ulysses this is the only instance.  
40 cf. Sigmund Freud: “Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten.“ Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 
1981, Hélène Cixous: “The Laugh of The Medusa” trans. Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, Signs 1, no. 4 
(1976): 875-93. 
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frequently associated with loose hair), but also censors the transgression of 
social norms (in this case, inappropriately powerful or unarticulated laughter). 
The addition “she knew what it meant” also suggests a strong link between 
Molly’s laughter and her sexuality. The term “month water”, albeit most probably 
being a misspelling, or indeed a Freudian slip (corrected to “mouth water” in 
Hans Walter Gabler’s edition), might provide an interesting connection to the 
female cycle, which is referenced on several occasions in Penelope: “God 
knows theres always something wrong with us 5 days every 3 or 4 weeks” 
(709.20), “Have we too much blood up in us or what O patience above its 
pouring out of me like the sea”41 (719.29-30), “I don’t want to ruin the clean 
sheets the clean linen I wore brought it on too damn it damn it” (719.31-32). The 
female cycle is naturally associated with the body, especially with fertility and 
the possibility of procreation, but also with the idea of not being pregnant and 
therefore not being able to pass on one’s genetic material (“he didn’t make me 
pregnant as big as he is” [719.31]). An associative connection between 
menstruation and reproduction takes place in Molly’s thoughts as well, when 
she considers the importance of “a stain on the bed to know youre a virgin for 
them all that’s troubling them theyre such fools too you could be a widow or 
divorced 20 times over a daub of red ink would do or blackberry juice no that’s 
too purply” (719.33-36). Interestingly enough, Hélène Cixous also uses the 
imagery of overflowing and of the sea in her article “The Laugh of the Medusa”, 
where she examines possibilities of écriture feminine and its possible liberating 
effect on women: “I, too, overflow. […] Time and again I, too, have felt so full of 
luminous torrents that I could burst […] I said to myself: You are mad! What’s 
the meaning of these waves, these floods, these outbursts?” (876). Cixous also 
directly connects laughter to an act of liberation through transgression: “Our 
glances, our smiles, are spent; laughs exude from all our mouths; our blood 
flows and we extend ourselves without ever reaching an end; we never hold 
back our thoughts, our signs, our writing” (878). While Cixous is certainly more 
radical in her theory of écriture feminine than Joyce with regard to Penelope,42 
                                                 
41 Katherine Mullin informs us about the fact that this was an actual scientific belief around the turn of the 
century in her article “Menstruation in Ulysses”. JJQ, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (Spring-Summer 2009), pp. 497-
508. 
42 In fact, Joyce was also heavily criticised by later feminist criticism for allegedly reproducing gender 
stereotypes in his portrayal of Molly Bloom. Derek Attridge gives a concise and insightful summary of 
Sandra Gilbert’s and Susan Gubar’s main points of criticism (Joyce Effects 106-111).  
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two similarities are particularly noteworthy: Firstly, Cixous not only associates 
écriture feminine with the body, but claims that the body forms an integral part of 
écriture feminine, and indeed that it could not come into being without the body. 
Secondly, Cixous stresses the endlessness of womanhood (“we extend 
ourselves without ever reaching an end”, “body without end, without appendage, 
without principal “parts.” [punct. sic!] [889]), just like Joyce seems to be hinting 
at it in Penelope. Similarly to Joyce, Cixous also manages to combine a theory 
focussed on “real-life”, bodily aspects of womanhood with the very abstract 
notion of womanhood in general. Contrary to Joyce, however, she sees these 
two things as synonymous and does not distinguish between women as human 
beings and limitless womanhood as a concept beyond humanity, but claims that 
both aspects are inherent in every single woman and can be set free with the 
correct technique of writing.  
Social and gender norms are, however, not the only ones Molly transgresses 
in Penelope. The literally overflowing style of the chapter, as well as the 
technique of interior monologue also suggest a novel treatment of time. Molly’s 
thoughts are meticulously (dis)arranged into an associative web of thoughts and 
connections in which discourse time and narrated time are strongly interwoven. 
In this respect, the stream of consciousness technique can not only be seen as 
the closest representation in language of “pure duration”, but also of 
“simultaneity”, as the thoughts and associations are not connected in a 
teleological, linear fashion, but rather happen all at once and frequent, fluid 
overlaps occur. The general discourse of excess and transgression also finds an 
equivalent in the chapter’s treatment of time itself, as Molly complains about her 
watch being broken: “I never know the time even that watch he gave me never 
seems to go properly” (699.15-16). This passage manages to summarise the 
highly complex philosophical issue of an almost inexpressible abundance of 
time by trivialising it and alluding to it in a rather laconic way. The playful 
translation of highly abstract matters into banal everyday situations, which are 
nevertheless incredibly apt at displaying the problem in a nutshell, seems to be 
one of the defining techniques of Ulysses.43 Another detail featured in this 
particular quotation is that it is Bloom who gave her the watch in the first place, 
an act which can be read as a means of trying to control Molly and to artificially 
                                                                                                                                               
 
43 cf. e.g. the aforementioned secondary use of newspaper by Bloom in Calypso. 
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impose an order into the generally abundant and ever-moving nature of her 
whole being. Just as the hairpins eventually fall out of Molly’s hair, she also 
manages to overcome the boundaries of time in Penelope, since the symbolic 
instrument of time measuring appears to be itself faulty. This passage of course 
also immediately evokes Bergson’s notion that clock time is not an accurate way 
of measuring time, but an artificial, constructed human invention which originally 
served a pragmatic purpose, such as the invention of Greenwich Mean Time in 
1880, whose major function was the creation of nationwide timetables for trains:  
[The effect of] the standardisation of the Greenwich meridian and the 
synchronisation of clocks around the world in order to serve the needs of 
modern transport and communication systems (the railway, the 
telegraph) was to make the passage of time and distance suddenly seem 
to change in a very obvious and public way. Alongside this regulated 
universality of temporal and spatial measurement, however, both the 
physical and psychological sciences were paradoxically beginning to 
reveal its arbitrariness, and the relativity of temporal experience. 
(Parsons 109 paraphrasing Kern 1983)   
In this case, however, the watch does not only represent an artificial social 
convention that Bloom imposes on his wife, but also a (failed) attempt at 
controlling the exuberant nature of her being. In a similar way, Molly also 
complains about the aforementioned ring she received from her past lover, 
which she has to “keep turning and turning to get it over the knuckle” (701.4-5). 
The frequent, ever-present interjection “O” might also be a typographical 
representation of a wedding ring44 and Molly’s inability to escape from her 
marriage with Bloom, even though she manages to transgress certain cultural 
boundaries and her desire is given a voice in this chapter. Molly’s boundless 
nature is also characterised by never-ending motion and restlessness: “every 
day I get up theres some new thing on sweet God sweet God well when Im 
stretched out dead in my grave I suppose Ill have some peace” (719.10-12). In 
this case, the cyclical (“every day”), but also the infinite movement attributed to 
Molly assumes a certain compulsive and Sisyphus-like quality, just like in all of 
the other discussed chapters.  
At the very last page of Penelope, the narrative pace accelerates and 
becomes more ecstatic as the interjection “Yes” becomes more frequent and 
disrupts the textual flow more strongly than before and even renders sentences 
ungrammatical (e.g. “or shall I wear a red yes” [732.17], “and then he asked me 
                                                 
44 cf. also Joyce’s use of symbols and sigla, which is very common in Finnegans Wake. 
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would I yes to say yes” [732.20]), which is not the case in prior interjections (e.g. 
“he said you have no proof it was her proof O yes her aunt was very fond of 
oysters [691.36-692.1]). The grammar of this section is generally more blurred 
and the sentences are less comprehensible than before, which either suggests 
a strong sense of agitation or of sleepiness.45 In either case, this last section 
points towards a strong sense of finality and displays teleological tendencies, 
which are, however, not resolved, but redirected towards the beginning by 
means of circularity. Another aspect that contributes to the idea of Penelope as 
reuniting teleology and circularity is the fact that the chapter ends in the future 
tense, while Molly is actually thinking about things long past and concluded 
(Bloom’s marriage proposal), therefore reinforcing this dichotomy on a 
grammatical level.46 
Moreover, while the first and the last “yes” form a possible structural circle, 
there does not seem to be any linear progress connected to this word, other 
than its accumulation at the ending of the chapter, which, however, does not 
necessarily mean that the interior monologue has come to a standstill at this 
point.  
Another interesting aspect of this very last word is that by connecting the final 
and the first letter of the book, Penelope also assumes the role of a mediator 
between female and male discourse. This idea is further supported by the 
conceptual, stylistic and even lexical connections between Penelope and 
Proteus. Firstly, and probably most trivially, both chapters feature an excessive 
amount of interior monologue.47 In the grander scheme of things, Proteus and 
Penelope are also the last chapters of their respective part of Ulysses (I and III, 
                                                 
45 There has been much debate, which I cannot possibly outline at this point, concerning both the nature 
of the interjections in this particular section and the general idea of what is actually physically happening. 
The two major “solutions” seem to be that Molly is either sexually excited at this point and possibly even 
reaches a climax expressed through the final “Yes”, or that she is gradually going back to sleep. 
Diametrically opposed as these two solutions might be, they both support the sense that a strong 
teleological moment is palpable throughout these last words.  
46 It is interesting to note that in German, „Ich will“ is the common reply to both marriage proposals and 
at the legal marriage ceremonies, constituting a speech act of major importance. Even though this is not 
the case in English, Joyce could have been aware of that meaning, which also fits the context of marriage 
present in this section. Recent Genetic research has shown that the phrase in question was originally 
intended to read “I would” and was only changed by Joyce shortly before publication, which attributes 
great weight and importance to the phrase. Moreover, the phrase “I will” rings strangely ungrammatical 
as a reply to the original question posed by Bloom (“would I yes to say yes”), as it changes the mode 
from conditional to a much more affirmative instance of future tense, which would be highly unusual for 
a native speaker, even in oral communication. Luca Crispi presented this discovery in his talk entitled 
“The courtship of Leopold and Molly Bloom” at the IV James Joyce Birthday Conference in Rome, 
February 2011. 
47 Even more blatantly, they both start with the same letter. 
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respectively). Although many chapters feature interior monologue, these two 
chapters are the only ones labelled “Monologue (male)” and “Monologue 
(female)” respectively in the Gilbert schema. However, the interconnection 
between these two chapters is much more complex. Not only are the general 
topics of motherhood, life and death discussed in both chapters (even the 
symbol of the sea is present in that context in both cases), but it also seems 
that Penelope achieves in many ways what Proteus has or cannot. While 
Stephen is merely “walking towards eternity on Sandymount Strand”, Penelope 
is assigned a lying eight as the symbol of eternity as its hour in the Linati 
schema. On a stylistic level, Penelope presents a radicalisation concerning the 
use of interior monologue, which Proteus merely hints at. On the textual level, a 
sort of prefiguration seems to be taking place in Proteus: “Open your eyes now. 
I will” (38.1). This passage is particularly noteworthy with regard to the idea that 
Molly is going to sleep at the end of Penelope, which would make the passage 
from Proteus a direct counterpart to the ending of Ulysses. Another passage of 
Proteus also features phrases which are present in Penelope in the same 
excited manner: “O yes, but I prefer Q. Yes, but W is wonderful. O yes. W” 
(41.1). A major difference between Proteus and Penelope, however, lies in the 
characters themselves, which are diametrically opposed in terms of conception. 
While Stephen is associated with the rational principle and very abstract 
matters, Molly is the complete opposite, since the connotations of Molly’s 
character are that of body and flesh (the organ assigned to Penelope in the 
Gilbert schema; cf. also “Der Fleisch, der stets bejaht”). Stephen and Molly 
seem to represent the mind-body dichotomy, which Stephen is trying to resolve 
in Proteus, on the level of characters. In a way, Penelope seems to propose a 
solution for this dichotomy in Molly’s imagining of Stephen as a possible future 
lover: 
first I thought he was a poet like Byron and not an ounce of it in his 
composition I thought he was quite different I wonder is he too young hes 
about wait […] what age was he then at Dillons 5 or 6 about 88 I suppose 
hes 20 or more Im not too old for him if hes 23 or 24 I hope hes not that 
stuck up university student sort. (725.3-8) 
This merging of opposites is also carried out on a larger scale, by the 
aforementioned stylistic, thematic and lexical overlaps between the two 
chapters. While Penelope, however, is ultimately chaotic and disordered, 
Proteus displays an associative, yet more or less ordered web of thoughts. 
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Although Proteus makes frequent use of stream of consciousness, this novel 
technique is constantly mediated by a more straightforward narrative voice. In 
comparison, Proteus is much less radical than Penelope, which might, once 
more, have to do with the fact that Stephen is associated with the rational, male 
principle and Molly with the irrational, body-focussed female one. This 
opposition also reminds us of Plato’s distinction between eternal, i.e. God-
created time and its human counterpart. While the eternal motion of time must 
necessarily be perfect and ordered, human time must always remain but an 
image of eternity, which also suggests that it is constantly in disorder. In this 
case, eternal time can be approximated by the notion of abstract thought in the 
case of Proteus, since the “intellect” was highly regarded in ancient Greek 
philosophy, while bodily matters were deemed less important and valued much 
less, as in the following quote once again taken from Plato’s Timaeus: 
When a man is always occupied with the cravings of desire and ambition, 
and is eagerly striving to satisfy them, all his thoughts must be mortal, 
and, as far as it is possible altogether to become such, he must be mortal 
every whit, because he has cherished his mortal part. But he who has 
been earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom, and has 
exercised his intellect more than any other part of him, must have 
thoughts immortal and divine, if he attain truth, and in so far as human 
nature is capable of sharing in immortality, he must altogether be 
immortal. (35b) 
This idea also corresponds to Stephen’s own worldview, which associates 
women with irrationality and with original sin and characterises his relationship 
with his mother and with all other female characters in Portrait and Ulysses, 
which is somewhat problematic to say the least.  
Essentially, Molly’s overflow of life and its depiction in Penelope can also be 
read as an attempt at resolving the dichotomy between form and formlessness 
inherent in every artistic representation of life, which is “always in latent 
opposition to the form” (Simmel 12). Indeed Molly’s slightly disjointed, though 
associatively still connected rant, which Jean-Michel Rabaté deems “closer to 
utter madness than to normal female psychology” (52) seems to present a “fully 
positive drive towards life which is actively repressing [form]” (Simmel 13), 
which strives “to absorb the form [which has been forced upon it] in its 
immediacy, to let its own power and fullness stream forth just as if it emanated 
from life’s own source, until all cognition, values and forms are reduced to direct 
manifestations of life” (Simmel 12). I strongly object to Rabaté’s idea of 
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Penelope as the portrait of a raving lunatic, but propose to see the chapter as a 
very strong and “direct manifestation of life” and a highly successful attempt at 
depicting life in its purest, distilled and de-stilled form instead. 
Just like Homer’s Odysseus is constantly prevented from reaching Ithaca, 
returning home to Penelope and finally arriving at the projected teleological goal 
of his wandering, which also represents a circle, as his leaving point is the same 
one as his final destination, Ulysses seems to evade the limiting perspective of 
straightforward finality, but rather introduces “the sense of an unstoppable 
onward movement ignoring all conventional limits” instead, as Derek Attridge 
suggests (Joyce Effects 98). Both Penelope, the weaver, and Ulysses itself play 
an endinggame with the reader’s expectations throughout the text. Contrary to 
usual narrative development, where the moment of peripeteia takes place 
around the middle of the text, Ulysses does not reach it until its very last 
chapter, if indeed the climax within Penelope can be described that way at all. 
As peripeteia “depends on our confidence of the end” and “is a disconfirmation 
followed by a consonance” (Kermode 18), its lack in Ulysses results in a 
disconfirmation of reader expectations rather than consonance. This aspect 
also points towards the idea that there might still be more to come and that 
while Penelope is a turning point in the narrative in so far as it presents a 
woman’s perspective of the day’s events mostly carried out by male characters, 
it can only be conceived of in connection with its preceding chapters, which 
would also turn into its following chapters if we consider the case of “Yes” / 
“Stately”. If Penelope is indeed seen as the peripeteia of Ulysses, its 
continuation would be a rereading of Ulysses from the beginning with 
completely changed expectations. In this way, Molly can not only be seen as 
“prehuman” and “posthuman”, but also as a “post-text”, which becomes a “pre-
text” at the same time. After all, the symbol of dawn also combines both the 
ending of one day and the start of another. 
3.2 Finnegans Wake 
In Finnegans Wake, the topic of beginnings and endings, but also their 
exemplification in the cycle of life and death is discussed at great length, and 
indeed the text’s form is defined by this very issue. These considerations are 
traceable on a greater scale, as far as conceptualisation and structure are 
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concerned, but also form an integral part of the frequent metapoetic 
discussions, and constitute a defining element of plot. Indeed, matters of form 
cannot be separated from the plot itself, which in turn is defined by the text’s 
cyclical nature. At this point, it already becomes apparent that the Book of Kells 
(and in particular its symbolism of the two snakes intertwined without a clear 
beginning or ending respectively) is much more than just a frequent intertextual 
reference in the multilayered chiasmic c(ha)osmos that is Finnegans Wake.  
3.2.1 Vic(i)o’s Cycles vs. The Wake’s Progress 
It is a truth universally acknowledged that Giambattista Vico’s La Nuova 
Sciencia is one of the founding principles of structure, or rather ‘anti-structure’ 
present in Finnegans Wake. However, unlike the Odyssey for Ulysses, Vico’s 
theories cannot be applied to Finnegans Wake in the same manner and to the 
same extent. While Samuel Beckett acknowledges the “soothing” quality, which 
is “like the contemplation of a carefully folded ham-sandwich” of a one-to-one 
application of Vico’s theories to the Wake, he feels that 
there is the temptation to treat every concept like ‘a bass dropt neck fust 
in till a bung crate’, and make a really tidy job of it. Unfortunately such an 
exactitude of application would imply distortion in one of two directions. 
Must we wring the neck of a certain system in order to stuff it into a 
contemporary pigeon-hole, or modify the dimensions of that pigeon-hole 
for the satisfaction of the analogymongers? (19) 
In spite of his (justified) scepticism towards a careless application and forced 
projection of a theory onto a text, Beckett does explore certain connections 
between Vico’s ideas expressed in La Nuova Sciencia and Joyce’s work and 
mentions two particularly important concepts: “[Vico’s] division of the 
development of human society into three ages: Theocratic, Heroic, Human 
(civilized)” (20), which is connected to “[h]is exposition of the ineluctable circular 
progression of Society” (ibid.) and his “theory of the origins of poetry and 
language, the significance of myth, and the nature of barbaric civilization” 
(ibid.). Most importantly, Beckett calls Joyce’s recurrence to these aspects 
“reverberations” and “reapplications”, which, “however, [do not receive] the 
faintest explicit illustration […] in Work in Progress” (ibid.). He sees Vico’s 
“inevitability of cyclic evolution” (19) as “a Necessity that is not Fate, […] a 
Liberty that is not Chance […]. This force he called Divine Providence, with his 
tongue, one feels, very much in his cheek” (22).  
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Clearly, Vico’s conception of time and history differs a great deal from Plato’s 
recount of cyclical time as an image of eternity. While Vico introduces the 
concept of “Divine Providence” in the realm of human affairs, for Plato, 
everything of human origin is imperfect by default and can therefore not be 
subject to Divine Providence. The major difference between these concepts, 
apart from the fact that Vico applies his theories to history and not directly to 
time, is certainly that Vico’s approach features a certain amount of inevitability 
and necessity which is exempt from Plato’s definition of a circular movement of 
time as an approximation of eternity.  
Both Margot Norris and Ruben Borg have pointed out that the cycles in 
Finnegans Wake are essentially different from Vico’s concept as far as their 
inevitability is concerned:  
This type of repetition does not appear to be merely predetermined like 
Vico’s events, which repeat themselves because the logical progression 
of evolutionary change brings each cycle to a close in precisely the same 
condition as it began. Rather the repetition in Finnegans Wake appears 
to be compulsive, that is, produced by irrational rather than logical 
necessity, and therefore actively induced – the result of human impulse 
rather than time. (Norris 25-26)48 
They also agree on the idea that Joyce’s use of cycles essentially implies a lack 
of teleology and progressive movement: 
[i]n Joyce’s book, […] what repeats does not punctuate progress. The 
periodic re-emergence of a given motif or the reworking of a particular 
event will function independently of that sense of historical inevitability, of 
rational consequence, that is the mark of well-constructed plots. (Borg 7) 
Borg concludes that “compulsive repetition implies a paralysis of sorts: a staying 
of time [which] [appears to have been immobilized, emptied of content]” (ibid.). 
While both of these approaches, in their own way, must arrive at this conclusion 
by way of “logical necessity”, they overlook an important factor concerning the 
structure as well as the plot of Finnegans Wake. While Vico’s cycles must 
necessarily be linked to a certain idea of compulsiveness by definition, since 
they are part of the process of history, the cycles in Finnegans Wake in fact do 
not only present “a repetition of identical moments” (ibid.), but display a certain 
creative potential in their affinity to change and development. While certain 
themes and motifs are taken up over and over again in the course of the book, 
                                                 
48 Norris’s somewhat problematic differentiation between time as a rational force and human impulse as 
an irrational factor in the development of the text is discussed in Borg (7-8) and, although unfortunate, 
need not be discussed at this point, since it does not alter her essential hypothesis.  
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they are never actually the same, albeit referring to the same ideas and re-
enacting them, but always altered slightly or considerably from the versions 
offered before. Furthermore, the cycle of death and resurrection, probably the 
most prominent one to be found in Finnegans Wake, offers a positive 
counterbalance to the idea of death as the ultimate ending point of human life. 
Moreover, while the whole book is undoubtedly constructed in a cyclical way 
(this fact is not only traceable in the famous last / first sentence of Finnegans 
Wake “A way a lone a last a loved along the / riverrun past Eve and Adam’s, 
from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of 
recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs” [628.16 / 3.1]), but also, as 
this study suggests, on the level of plot and even lexis), a certain teleological 
drive can be perceived throughout the text as well, which is particularly palpable 
towards the actual ending (or re-beginning) of the text. At several points in the 
text, the narrative pace quickens and / or slows down and the abovementioned 
cycles are not mere repetitions, but do show a certain kind of development in 
some cases. Moreover, most of the characters fulfil a metamorphosis and / or 
represent many personages (or objects) at the same time – this idea represents 
a strong sense of multiplicity, but certainly not a static one. Similarly to Ulysses, 
however, teleology is not aimed at the actual ending of the text, which is 
formally non-existent in this case, but back towards the beginning.   
This chapter will consist of an analysis of two particular motifs in Finnegans 
Wake: the warring twin brothers Shem and Shaun on the one hand and 
Annalivia Plurabelle on the other hand, considering their respective treatment of 
(non-)endings and (re-)beginnings. In the context of Shem and Shaun, a 
particular focus will be placed on Giordano Bruno’s idea of concordia discors49 
and the treatment of the cycle of life and death as a representation of teleology 
and cyclicality in The Ondt and the Gracehoper, while ALP becomes especially 
important in this respect with regard to her daughter, Issy, and the concept of 
genealogy as a means of ensuring continuity. The analysis will take into 
account both the macro level of structure and plot and the micro level of lexis 
and grammar by means of close – reading.   
For the sake of clarity, I shall use the terms “ending” and “beginning”, 
although they are necessarily problematic in the context of Finnegans Wake, in 
                                                 
49 Cf. Bruno’s work Cantus Circaeus. 
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order to indicate the ending and beginning of the actual material book rather 
than constantly evading and circumscribing this terminology. Even though the 
text itself uses certain tactics of transgressing these boundaries, they are 
present in the actual printed book and will be used when referring to certain 
passages in order to avoid confusion. It should have become clear at this point 
that in my line of argument, the “ending” of Finnegans Wake is a non-ending of 
sorts, and its “beginning” can only be described as a re-beginning. Moreover, 
although the book is undeniably circular in terms of conception, I believe the 
teleological drive towards the actual ending of the book is perceivable and the 
last sentence is split before “riverrun” for well-considered reasons. 
3.2.2 “Them boys is so contrairy” – The warring brothers Shem and Shaun 
The problematic relationship between the brothers Shem and Shaun, the sons 
of HCE and ALP, is one of the many leitmotifs present in Finnegans Wake. This 
relationship is mirrored in various sections of the book, most famously in the 
story of the Mookse and the Gripes, The Ondt and the Gracehoper and the 
geometry lesson presented in II.2. The idea of Shem and Shaun as warring 
brothers, or indeed two parts of a whole that have been separated, but are 
bound to be unified in the end, goes back to Giordano Bruno’s theory of 
concordia discors, which is best exemplified towards the end of Finnegans 
Wake in yet another mirroring of the brothers, this time through the characters 
Juva and Muta (which are in turn variations of the Mutt and Jute motif first 
encountered in I.1): “Muta: So that when we shall have acquired unification we 
shall pass on to diversity and when we shall have passed on to diversity we 
shall have acquired the instinct to combat and when we shall have acquired the 
instinct of combat we shall pass back to the spirit of appeasement” (FW 610,23-
27). The aspect of “combat” and “appeasement” is staged and alluded to on 
various occasions throughout the book. As an example of a possible merging of 
the twin brothers’ diametrically opposed lifestyles and worldviews, I shall 
analyse the tale of The Ondt and the Gracehoper, where the aforementioned 
appeasement and reunification takes place both on the level of plot and on a 
more abstract level, with the help of Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of time.   
The implications of the unusual connection between the two brothers are 
manifold. For this study, I shall concentrate on two in particular. Firstly, the fact 
that Shem and Shaun are always seen in relation to each other (except in the 
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“Portrait of Shem the Penman” section from I.7) and often presented as almost 
indistinguishable from each other suggests that the text defies clear boundaries 
of individual identities and allows for a novel and creative questioning of the 
very concept and formal necessity of clear-cut divisions between characters. 
This idea is also expressed by the frequent metamorphoses of characters 
(especially HCE) into historical and fictional political figures (e.g. the Russian 
General), inanimate objects (the washerwomen turn into a tree and stone at the 
end of I.8), but also into each other (The Ondt and the Gracehoper switch roles; 
ALP is succeeded by her daughter Issy). The effortless changing to and fro 
between animate personas and inanimate objects, which almost all characters 
undergo, can further be interpreted as a blurring between the boundaries of life 
and death and a reinforcement of their strong interconnection, which is a major 
theme both in Ulysses (especially in Hades, as discussed above) and the 
Wake.  
Secondly, the idea that two opposed principles can eventually be united and 
its exemplification on the textual level via oxymora and homophones containing 
conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable concepts can be read as an essential 
struggle within the complex universe that is Finnegans Wake: the struggle 
between its cyclical structure and never-ending nature and the need for a 
certain kind of form, which can only be materialistically produced and perceived 
in a linear fashion (cf. also Fagan 6). While this discrepancy was eventually 
resolved by pushing lexis (and, in a few cases, grammar) to its utmost possible 
limit, the book’s necessarily linear form cannot do its complex simultaneity full 
justice. In a way, Finnegans Wake is faced with the problem of three-
dimensional space, which can only be described in a linear fashion, as 
discussed by Bergson (103), for it must obey the material rules of the concept 
“book” in order to be perceived as one, while at the same time aiming at a 
much higher purpose, in which text, sound and various other media are 
combined. Just as the phrase “royal highness” is transfigured into “aural 
eyeness” (623.18), comprising the organs of sight (“eye”), hearing (“aural”) and 
taste (“oral”), Finnegans Wake itself is a text which not only caters for all the 
senses, but also reaches out far beyond its textuality and is, in that respect, not 
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only a “kingly work in progress” (625.13-14), but also an infinite one as far as its 
anagnostic50 re-reading is concerned.  
3.2.2.1The Ondt and the Gracehoper51 
In the tale of the Ondt and the Gracehoper, the twins’ duality leading towards 
eventual unification is laid out with a little help from Joyce’s philosophical 
friends. The brothers are represented through the dual antagonists of Aesop’s 
fable The Ant and The Grasshopper, with a casting of Shaun as the frugal, 
hard-working ant, and Shem as the hedonistic, lazy grasshopper – a reference 
which seems surprisingly clear in the rather vague realm of intertextual allusions 
in the Wake. In this episode, there are three main opposed pairings, which 
appear absolutely irreconcilable at first, but are eventually merged and unified, 
just like Shem and Shaun. 
The main opposition present in the Ondt and the Gracehoper – apart from 
the diametrically opposed conception of the characters as such – seems to be 
that between Plato’s cyclical and Aristotle’s linear concept of time. In The Ondt 
and the Gracehoper, this discrepancy is, once again, discussed in connection 
with another pairing closely connected to this topic: the cycle of life and death, 
which, in turn, is reflected in the characters and their respective lifestyle. The 
third juxtaposition present in this section is that of time and space as they are 
mirrored in the characters of the Ondt and the Gracehoper.  
In The Ondt and the Gracehoper, Plato and Aristotle are not only alluded to 
(more or less) directly as “plate o’monkynous” (417.15) and “aristotaller” (417. 
16), but also their theories are integrated in the episode in a more abstract 
manner. For once, Aristotle’s notion of the point as both the end of one “now” 
and the beginning of another (“using the one point as two” [Physics, IV.11.39]) 
in connection with the “point[, which] both connects and terminates the length” 
(IV.11.38) seems particularly important with regard to Shem and Shaun and the 
notion of them being alter egos, or even, as some scholars have suggested, two 
parts of HCE. The best way the warring concepts of Plato and Aristotle can be 
analysed in this context is through the imagery of life and death used in this 
                                                 
50 This term is a coinage by Fritz Senn (Inductive Scrutinies). The general idea behind it is that an “ideal 
reader” in the case of Finnegans Wake is a re-reader, because it is not possible to recognise certain 
allusions and prefigurations the first time around.  
51 This chapter is based on my talk entitled “’Heidegger, Heidegger was a boozy beggar.’ Philosophical 
Approaches to Time and Space in The Ondt and the Gracehoper” given at the XXII James Joyce 
Symposium in Prague, June 2010.  
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episode. There are numerous references both to life as a cycle and to death as 
a (teleo)logical consequence of the process of life, but also on some occasions, 
to both aspects at once.  
The description of the Gracehoper begins with an account of his hedonist 
lifestyle, immediately followed by a reference to the “funny funereels with 
Besterfarther Zeuts, the Aged One, […] albedinous and oldbuoyant, inscythe his 
elytrical wormcasket” (414.35 – 415.1). The allusion to “funerals” and 
“wormcasket”, by which most probably a coffin is meant, is an obvious 
reference to death, yet at the same time, the funeral is “fun”, as “reels” are 
apparently played on that occasion. This idea echoes the self-destructive life of 
abundant entertainment, food and drink which the gracehoper is leading and 
therefore introduces a close link between life and death52. “Zeuts” refers on the 
one hand to Zeus, the Alpha and Omega of the Greek Gods (this idea is also 
reflected in the initials A-ged O-ne, but also in a-lbedinous and o-ldbuoyant), but 
on the other hand to time (German: Zeit). The mentioning of a “scythe” signifies 
an overt allusion to Father Time on the one hand, thus reaffirming the circular 
quality of time, but also serves as a foreshadowing of death, which can be read 
as the ultimate and inevitable denial of a circular movement, thus combining the 
two motifs and theories in a single image. After that reference, however, motifs 
of continuity and circularity prevail over those of death, like, for instance, the 
symbol of the wheel in “The whool of the whaal in the wheel of the whorl” 
(415.8) – the alliteration can also be seen as a means of enhancing the sense 
of continuity on a stylistic level, as well as the repetition of “ra” in the phrase “to 
the ra, the ra, the ra, the ra” (415.11).53 Another particularly important reference 
to both the circularity and finiteness of time can be found in the phrase “for 
O’Cronione lags acrumbling in his sands but his sunsunsuns still tumble on” 
(415.20). Not only does it resemble the lines of the popular song “John Brown’s 
body lies amouldering in the grave, but his soul goes marching on” (McHugh), 
suggesting yet another instance of death and resurrection, but it also probably 
alludes to the Greek Titan Kronos, who overthrew his father Uranus by 
                                                 
52 In Freudian terms, the Gracehoper implements both the death drive (thanatos) and the eros within 
himself, symbolising once again a reunification of opposed principles. (cf. Sigmund Freud: Jenseits des 
Lustprinzips (1920). In: Studienausgabe, Bd. III: Psychologie des Unbewußten. Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer 1975, S. 213-272.) 
53 Of course this particular image can also be read as a reference to the Wheel of Fortune, which bears an 
upward as well as a downward movement and can influence an individual’s life both positively and 
negatively (cf. also Mengel). 
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castrating him and throwing his testicles into the sea, which eventually resulted 
in the birth of Venus, or “Mrs Mereschame” (214.14), as she is called in 
Finnegans Wake. The castration of Uranus symbolises a violent disruption of 
the continuum of genealogy, as it renders further procreation impossible. 
Moreover, the act of patricide and the violent overthrowing of the father figure is 
certainly a major theme within the realm of Finnegans Wake in connection with 
Shem and Shaun, for instance in the episode How Buckley Shot the Russian 
General (II.3), where the Russian General’s (i.e. HCE’s) death is interpreted as 
an act of the twins’ supplanting and dethroning him. 
Kronos’s “sunsunsun” Zeus (also called Zeus Cronion, to complicate the 
matter even further) eventually overthrew Kronos himself, although Kronos was 
careful enough to swallow all of his other children immediately after birth, not 
counting on Zeus being secretly raised by his mother in order to seek 
vengeance on him. In a way, this act can be seen along the lines of continuity in 
so far as it repeats the deed of Zeus’s own father and therefore connects the 
two generations. What this allusion further displays is a very strong theme of 
generational succession and, once again, the necessary interconnection 
between life and death, but also at the same time an interlinkage of the two 
concepts of time discussed in the beginning, depending on the way the reader 
chooses to place their focus (either on “acrumbling” or decaying, or on the more 
positive, future-related idea of the son “still tumble[ing] on”, which might also be 
read as “the sun still shining on”).  
The concepts proposed by Plato and Aristotle, although seeming 
diametrically opposed at first, reach a sense of reconciliation within the realm of 
the ambiguous potential that probably only Finnegans Wake is able to – or 
dares to – convey. The concepts stand on their own, while permeating each 
other at the same time, just as Shem and Shaun, although they are individually 
developed characters, can only be conceived of in relation to each other. A 
particularly noteworthy biographical detail in this context is the dependence of 
Aristotle on Plato as his disciple, which provides yet another parallel to Shem 
and Shaun, as well as Plato’s hostility towards art, which is resembled in the 
figure of the Ondt. 
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This brings us – not by a “commodius vicus of recirculation” (1.2), but rather 
by an Aristotelean sense of teleology – to the actual characters of the Ondt and 
the Gracehoper and their connection to time and space. 
The Gracehoper lives in a “summery […] cottage, which was cald fourmillierly 
Tingsomingenting” (414.34), while the Ondt’s space is “cold antitopically 
Nixnixundnix (415.29)”. At first glance, this passage suggests an opposition 
between nothing (“Nixnixundnix”) and something (“Tingsomingenting”). 
However, typically for Finnegans Wake, “en ting som ingen ting” also means “a 
thing like no thing, a mere nothing” in Danish, and therefore encompasses 
duality within just one element of the opposition.  
Another antagonism present on the level of characters is that between their 
respective associations with the notions of hot (“caldo”) and cold (“cold”) and, as 
a result, with summer and winter. This distinction in terms of seasons is a 
reflection of the characters’ general lifestyle on a smaller scale: that of the 
Gracehoper as a hedonist, with a special emphasis on “head”, for he is said to 
have “schelling in kopfers” (416.4) or “leivnitz in his hair” (416.29) and is 
generally more concerned with meta- and physical matters than with securing 
his existence, and that of the Ondt as a frugal and character whose life evolves 
around thrift and labour as a means of ensuring a secure future, even in 
adverse circumstances. The Gracehoper lives in the “now” of summer as 
opposed to the Ondt, who is already preparing for the wintertime. In contrast to 
the Gracehoper, the Ondt is not depicted as having any major intellectual 
thoughts, except in connection with food (“plate o’monkynous and a confucion 
of minthe (for he was a conformed aceticist and aristotaller” [417.15-16]). 
As already mentioned, the conflict between the two characters is also 
perceivable along the lines of time and space. While the Ondt is introduced as a 
“weltall fellow, raumybult” (416.3), referring to the German words “all” and 
“Raum”, whose general occupation seems to be the “making [of] spaces in his 
psyche” (416.5-6), the Gracehoper first enters the scene in (one might state 
almost excessive) motion: “The Gracehoper was always jigging ajog, hoppy on 
akkant of his Joycity” (414.22). He is further associated with “swallow[ing] 
lustres” (416.21), “devour[ing] fourty flights of styearcases” (416.22) “chew[ing] 
up all the mensas and seccles” (416.22-23) and “vorasious[ing] [timeplaces] 
most glutinously” (416.24) throughout the episode. It is important to note that 
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the Gracehoper is not only associated with time and motion, but that these 
notions always seem to bear an aspect of almost violent excess and 
decadence, whereas the Ondt symbolises frugality and a controlled lifestyle, 
being described as “sair sair sullemn and chairmanlooking” (416.4-5) or “mothst 
sacred” (416.7), but also, in terms of motion, as a very static character who – 
interestingly enough, although being associated with space – does not move a 
great deal. Most of the time he is described as “making […] spaces” (416.5), 
“pray[ing]” (415.34) or “smolking a spatial brunt of Hosana cigals” (417.12-13), 
while the Gracehoper “jigg[s]” or “jingle[s] through a jungle of love and debts 
and jangle[s] through a jumble of life” (416.9). This time, the antagonism is not 
as easily resolved as the philosophical one, as it is not until the end of the fable 
that a reversal of roles takes place. While in the first section it was the 
Gracehoper “always making ungraceful overtrures to Fluh and Luse and Bienie 
and Vespatilla to play pupa-pupa and policy-pulicy” (414.24-26), now it is the 
Ondt who is a “baskerboy on the Libido, with Floh biting his leg thigh and Luse 
lugging his luff leg and Bieni bussing him under his bonnet and Vespatilla 
blowing cosy fond tutties up the allabroad length of the large of his smalls.” 
(417.17-20). Apart from demonstrating very convincingly once again Joyce’s 
use of ambiguity (or in this case rather his use of thinly veiled explicit 
suggestion), this passage dealing with the reversal of roles shows once again 
the interchangeability of the characters and their very strong interconnection. 
In The Ondt and the Gracehoper, Joyce not only sets up binary oppositions 
and deconstructs them at the same time, but in fact also deconstructs the binary 
opposition of “binary opposition vs. merging of opposites” itself by already 
including an ambiguous meaning in just one of the two factors. In the end, the 
“mouschical unsummables” (417.9) become “musical ensembles”, the 
“Doublends” are “J[o]ined” (20.16) and the brothers are merged into a 
metaphorical chronotopos, or “timeplace” (416.24) in Joycean terms. Rather 
than reinforcing the binary of the “either-or”, Joyce presents the reader with a 
more progressive alternative of the “either-and”. In the case of Shem and 
Shaun, the same is always at once itself and the other, while the other, once 
itself, is not only the same as the same, but also different at the same time. 
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3.3 “End here” (?) – ALP (dis)continued 
Annalivia Plurabelle (frequently abbreviated and referred to as ALP throughout 
the text), is not only a major character in Finnegans Wake as HCE’s wife, but 
also represents the river Liffey and therefore symbolises the idea of never-
ending flow. 
Similarly to Molly Bloom’s interior monologue in Ulysses, ALP’s soliloquy 
towards the end (or re-beginning) of Finnegans Wake seems to be overflowing 
in terms of narrative characteristics and style. In a way, this soliloquy can be 
read as a (more or less) final act of accumulation of the major themes present in 
Finnegans Wake. Her frequent references to death and rebirth, as well as her 
eventual mergence into the ocean (but also the seamless act of succession by 
her daughter Issy) at the end of the text, as well as her general reluctance 
towards death as her own personal ending suggest a strong wish for infinity on 
her side. ALP’s reluctance towards dying is expressed through direct 
lamentations (“O bitter ending!” [627.34-35]) and pleas for “Onetwo moremens 
[moments] more” (628.6) on the one hand, but also in the context of memory 
and ALP’s fear of being “forgodden” (625.18). 
In terms of textual structure, ALP’s soliloquy follows ALP’s Letter to “dear 
dirty Dublin”. It is characterised by short sentences and a relatively 
straightforward style (at least compared to other chapters). In that respect, but 
also in many other ways, it reminisces the first chapter mostly devoted to ALP, 
who is being talked and gossiped about by the two washerwomen in I.854. At 
the end of Book IV, ALP recounts the entire content of the previous chapters, 
but also at the same time hints at certain new aspects which can only be fully 
grasped through an anagnostic re-reading of the text. ALP is addressing both 
HCE and her father, the tailor encountered in II.3, differentiating between the 
pronoun “you” in connection with her husband HCE, and therefore speaking 
directly to him, and the pronoun “he”, which she mostly uses when talking about 
her father, who is assumed to be a symbol of the ocean, until she gradually 
“get[s] mixed” (FW 626.36) with the sea and so do the pronouns. 
ALP’s soliloquy, not unlike Molly Bloom’s interior monologue in Ulysses, 
comprises the most prominent characters, events and motifs of the whole book, 
                                                 
54 See Terence Killeen’s interpretation of this episode as yet another mirroring of the motif of the warring 
brothers (“Life, Death and the Washerwomen”). 
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recounting and re-evaluating them from ALP’s perspective. However, the link 
between ALP’s soliloquy and Molly’s monologue is much closer than might be 
expected at first. Not only are both told by women and situated at the very end 
of the respective text, as well as taking place between the ending of one day 
and the beginning of the next (in ALP’s case, the rising of the new day also 
symbolises the beginning of a new era), but there are quite a few more or less 
direct intertextual references to Ulysses in ALP’s soliloquy (e.g. “Not a sound” 
[619.21], “Blooming” [620.2], “lotus” [620.3]). Moreover, both of these 
discourses display a similar amount of unboundedness and defy formal and 
linguistic conventions and limitations up to a certain degree. In a way, ALP’s 
soliloquy can therefore be read as a continuation of Molly’s monologue, which is 
essentially circular with regard to form and structure and merely hints at the 
possibility of eternity, while ALP’s soliloquy is genuinely infinite in terms of form. 
Even more striking than these similarities, however, is the fact that both 
Penelope and ALP’s soliloquy serve as nodes and mediators between female 
and male discourse, or as Finn Fordham puts it: “indeed, the feminine river 
“brings us back” to the masculine earth of Howth” (471). Although Joyce 
certainly went more than just a few steps further in this context in Finnegans 
Wake, both (non-)endings share a similar concern: an appeal to the reader to 
re-evaluate and perhaps even re-read (this is certainly the case in Finnegans 
Wake) the whole text in the light of its last, “feminine” chapter.55 
The monologue starts out with the words “Soft morning, city! Lsp! I am leafy 
speafing” (619. 20). Already at this early stage of the passage, the re-reader of 
the Wake, in contrast to the first-time reader, can detect that the phrase “Soft 
morning” does not only refer to a particularly wet morning in order to give a 
setting for the soliloquy, but can also be read as “soft mourning”, thus evoking 
the image of the mourner’s monologue towards the very beginning of the book 
(I.1). However, the phrase “soft morning” is also taken up twice within the scope 
of the soliloquy itself (“Sft! It is the softest morning that ever I can ever 
remember me.” [621.8], “So soft this morning, ours.” [628.8]). In both cases, the 
phrase is connected to the realm of memory and ALP’s plea not to be forgotten 
                                                 
55 Interestingly enough, Genetic research has shown that Joyce himself revised quite a few aspects and 
sections of the first book, and the very beginning of Finnegans Wake in particular, only after having 
completed Book IV (cf. Fordham 469-479). 
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and can therefore be read as a reminder of ALP’s presence, but also of the 
beginning of the soliloquy once its end is reached.  
Similarly to their omnipresence in The Ondt and the Gracehoper, death and 
resurrection, but also “Death’s Brother, Sleep” (Illiad 16, 660-82 / Aen. 6, 278) 
and its counterpart, being awake, become especially prominent in Book IV. 
Although technically speaking, it is ALP who has not had a chance to speak for 
herself yet, and can therefore be said to have “slept so long” (619.25-26) 
herself, she seems preoccupied with waking HCE instead: “Rise up, man of the 
hooths, you have slept so long! Or is it only so mesleems? […] Rise up now and 
aruse! Norvena’s over” (619.25-29). Of course, if “mesleems” is read as “me 
sleeps”, a clear boundary concerning the sleeper’s identity cannot be drawn. 
The idea that ALP herself could also have been sleeping is further supported by 
ALP’s statement: “so has he as bored me to slump [McHugh: sleep]. But am 
good and rested” (619.32-33).56 ALP’s boredom can on the hand be a related to 
the fact that “[i]t is all so often and still the same to me” (625.16-17), but on the 
other hand, the mentioning of “bore” might simply refer to a tidal bore (this 
interpretation, in turn, would be supported by the fact that Dublin is spelt 
backwards a few lines afterwards, implying that an actual tidal bore might be 
taking place (“nill, Budd!” [620.3]).  
Another previously presented motif taken up in ALP’s soliloquy is that of the 
washerwomen encountered in I.8 washing HCE’s clothes in the river Liffey: 
“Here is your shirt, the day one, come back. The stock, your collar. Also your 
double brogues” (619.34-35). While this passage can be read as ALP simply 
handing HCE various articles of clothing, the phrase “the day one, come back” 
can also be interpreted as a foreshadowing of the text’s “come back” to “day [or 
page] one” of Finnegans Wake itself. ALP’s and HCE’s personal life is, 
however, also paralleled with certain historical political events within and 
beyond the realm of the Wake. There are, for instance, numerous references to 
the episode “How Buckley shot the Russian General” from II.3 (e.g. “buckly 
shuit Rosensharonals” [620.4], “Bugley Captain” [622.25]), but also to the 
problematic relationship between Ireland and Britain (e.g. “Proudpurse Alby with 
                                                 
56 If “Norvena” is understood to mean “Nirvana”, as McHugh suggests, the concept of remembering and 
forgetting is touched upon as well, since in a state of Nirvana, the person is supposed to be elevated 
beyond their earthly life and therefore does not participate in the act of memory.  
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his pooraroon Eireen” [620.5-6]). In the latter case, McHugh also suggests a 
possible intertextual allusion to the character Irena from Henrik Ibsen’s play 
When We Dead Awaken, which would connect the history of Ireland (and 
history in general) to the concept of death and resurrection, but also to 
petrification.57 In a way, it can therefore also be read as a reference to Vico’s 
theory of historical cycles, with the addition of the element of paralysis 
(petrification) discussed above. Moreover, the possible mentioning of Ibsen 
conjures up his play The Masterbuilder (Bygmester Solness), which is also 
referenced directly in ALP’s soliloquy (“Amid the soleness. Tilltop, bigmaster! 
Scale the summit. You’re not so giddy any more. All your graundplotting and the 
little it brought!” [624.10-13]) and, subsequently, “Bygmester Finnegan” (4.18), 
which provides yet another link from the last chapter of the book to the first 
one.58  
Yet another motif prominent throughout the text ALP discusses in her 
soliloquy is that of the warring brothers Shem and Shaun: 
Them boys is so contrairy. […] Heel trouble and heal travel. Galliver and 
Gellover. Unless they changes by mistake. I seen the likes in the 
twinngling of an aye. Som. So oft. Sim. Time after time. The sehm 
ashnuh. Two bredder as doffered as nors in soun. When one of him 
sighs or one of him cries ‘tis you all over. No peace at all. Maybe it’s 
those two old crony aunts held them out to the water front. (620.13-19) 
Indeed, as we have seen, the boys seem to be quite “contrairy” and “as 
doffered as nors in soun [North and South]”, but not irreconcilable, as Bruno’s 
theory, but also the tale of the Ondt and the Gracehoper show. Their sameness 
and difference are expressed at this point by ALP’s use of homophones and 
assonances, which represent different wor(l)ds, but nevertheless suggest a 
strong link between the two brothers (“Heel / heal”; “Galliver / Gellover”; “Som / 
Sim”). The actual names of the mingling, “twinngling” brothers are also present 
in this section in connection with yet another important theme in Finnegans 
Wake, “The sehm ashnuh” (“the same anew”). Their interlinked and inseparable 
identities also become apparent in the somewhat unclear and ambiguous 
pronoun “you” in the phrase “When one of him sighs or one of him cries ‘tis you 
all over”. While this sentence could theoretically also refer to HCE, whom ALP 
                                                 
57 The motif of petrification could, in turn, symbolise a playful reference to the washerwomen, one of 
whom turns into a stone at the end of I.8. 
58 Another motif from the first Book which is taken up during ALP’s hike with HCE is that of the hunting 
party, where HCE meets the king (622.23 – 622.31). Finn Fordham has analysed various parallels 
between the two chapters from a genetic point of view with striking results in the abovementioned work. 
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generally addresses as “you” in the soliloquy, it seems at this point that she 
might also be addressing one or both of her sons. Again, the sons’ actions are 
paralleled grammatically and also create assonance (“sighs / cries”). While in 
The Ondt and the Gracehoper, a possible reunification of the twins is hinted at, 
ALP clearly dismisses this thought (“No peace at all”), thus de-romanticising 
their relationship and stating that, at least from her point of view, a “spirit of 
appeasement” (610.27) seems unlikely. However, this sentence is also 
reminiscent of Molly’s thoughts about not being able to come to a standstill 
(“every day I get up theres some new thing on sweet God sweet God well when 
Im stretched out dead in my grave I suppose Ill have some peace” [U 719.10-
12]). Even though ALP is not “stretched out dead in [her] grave”, this topic is 
certainly prominent within the last pages of Finnegans Wake. ALP’s mentioning 
of “old crony aunts” can also be understood as a reminder of the merciless 
progression of time, or its master, “O’Cronione” (415.20).59  
As an impersonation of the river Liffey, ALP certainly represents a strong 
idea of teleology, since she will at some point unite with the ocean. However, 
while this eventual act of giving herself up cannot be a complete and final 
ending of her own identity, since by merging with the sea, she would not “die” in 
the literal sense of the word, but only become intermingled with other waters, 
she has ambivalent, or indeed “mixed” (626.36) feelings about the 
consequences of this act and fears it. In a way, the surprisingly clear and short 
sentences in that form the last 9 pages of Finnegans Wake can be read as a 
grammatical representation of her unwillingness to end her course and give up 
her reign (“And let her rain now if she likes” [627.11-12]) and the wish to prolong 
the moment of “fforvell” (626.33), maybe with the hope of avoiding it altogether. 
At the same time, however, the soliloquy is characterised by a somewhat fatalist 
calmness on ALP’s side and the feeling that she has, in fact, already put up with 
her fate (“Let her rain now” [my emphasis]).   
Already at an early stage of the soliloquy, ALP starts thinking about this topic: 
“I’ll wait. And I’ll wait. And then if all goes. What will be is. Is is” (620.31). This 
passage bears a prefiguration of later events, namely the reign of ALP’s 
daughter Issy and the dawning of a new era through a generational shift. Again, 
this new era is not something that is completely distinct from ALP’s own time, 
                                                 
59 Of course, this allusion also reverts back to The Ondt and the Gracehoper. 
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but rather ALP and Issy are part of the same river and follow the same course. 
This idea is expressed by the seemingly paradoxical simultaneity of present and 
future (“What will be is”), but also by a direct mentioning of Issy (“Is is”). Of 
course, the mentioning of Isis, the goddess of the dead, reintroduces both the 
aspect of death and of resurrection, as she managed to bring her husband 
Osiris back to life. As the text progresses, references to endings, fears of being 
forgotten and hopes of being remembered become more frequent.60  
Similarly to Molly Bloom, ALP briefly considers the medium of smell as a 
means of being remembered: “And you won’t urbjunk to me parafume, oiled of 
kolloney, with a spot of marashy. Sm! It’s Alpine Smile from Yesthers late 
Yesthers. I’m in everywince nasturtls. Even in Houlth’s nose.” (624.24-26). 
Although ALP’s Eau de Cologne (“oiled of kolloney”) is certainly not as 
elaborate a “parafume” as Molly’s “Peau d’espagne”, her smell of “urb[an] junk” 
(to which HCE, however, “won’t object”) is certainly much stronger than Molly’s, 
and therefore fulfils its purpose of a memento much better, as ALP claims to be 
in everyone’s nostrils, which probably makes them “wince” as a result.  
Although the entire soliloquy is essentially comprised of memories, ALP 
dismisses the past at one point (“Let besoms [bygones] be bosuns [bygones]” 
[621.1])61 and focuses on the present moment, when she has to make way for 
her daughter, instead: “It’s Phoenix, dear. And the flame is, hear! Let’s our 
joornee saintomichael make it” (621.1-2). While Phoenix Park is a very 
important location both in the realm of Irish history and of Finnegans Wake, as 
HCE’s mysterious crime is said to have taken place there, in this context it can 
also be regarded as the actual bird “phoenix”, which is supposed to rise from its 
own ashes. However, McHugh suggests a reading of “Phoenix” as “finished”, 
thus again fusing both the end of the phoenix’s life with its resurrection (which 
only lies in its symbolical function at this point). ALP seems to be determined to 
                                                 
60 In his article “Forget! Remember! Forget” – Memory, Amnesia and the Cyclical Metamorphosis of 
Meaning in Finnegans Wake, Paul Fagan addresses this issue in great detail and claims that the process of 
making meaning in Finnegans Wake is inseparably linked to its circular structure and that the ideal reader 
can only be a re-reader: “Th[e] appeal to remember [ALP]—and the book’s content—leads the reader 
back to a generative, or re-generative, invocation of memory in the book’s closing and opening words, 
“the / riverrun”, which evoke the German ‘Erinnerung’ (“memory”). This memorializing river returns the 
re-reader “back to Howth Castle and Environs,” and to an inventory of textual events enumerated in the 
second paragraph which have not yet occurred, or have not yet re-occurred. In other words, the reader is 
cyclically returned to a forward-looking beginning which counterpoises the book’s final acts of 
remembrance.” 
61 Once again, this statement is strangely similar to Molly’s dismissal of her past lovers in Ulysses: “I 
suppose theyre all dead and rotten long ago” (U 716.1-2)  
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“make [her] jo[u]rne[y]”, as “the flame is” already there. At the same time, she is 
making a “hike” (621.7) with HCE, for which she apparently needs “light 
enough” (621.4-5), but not “our laddy’s lampern” (621.5). In that respect, the 
“flame” can also be read as the flame of a torch.62 In a similar context, ALP also 
mentions “Eatster” (623.8) in connection with “newera’s day” (623.7). While 
Easter is a symbol of resurrection, or “arising” (623.26), New Year’s Day (or, 
indeed the day of a new era) stands for the beginning of something new rather 
than a resurrection of the old. However, the textual vicinity of these two phrases 
once again suggests a close link between two opposed principles, just as 
Annalivia Plurabelle will eventually be succeeded by Issy, but also, in a way, 
become Issy herself.  
As mentioned before, in ALP’s considerations about her merging with the 
ocean and with Issy, these events are not easily identifiable as either positively 
or negatively connotated, but rather seem to be both at one and the same time. 
On the one hand, she is thinking about the ocean as “salvocean” (623.29), 
evoking the idea of salvation from “all these years within years in soffran 
[suffering]” (625.30), but at the same time, she claims that it is “still the same to 
[her]” (625.18) and complains about having “[l]apped so long” in “the still sama 
sitta [city; German: Sitte]” (625.27).  
On the last pages of Finnegans Wake, ALP relives and revives her first 
encounter with HCE, which is once again connected to “adamant evar [Adam 
and Eve]” (626.3): “Sea, sea! Here, weire, reach, island, bridge. Where you 
meet I. The day. Remember! Why there that moment and us two only? I was 
but teen, a tiler’s dot” (626.7-9). This episode is also closely linked to her father, 
the tailor (“tiler”), who offered the Norwegian Captain (as yet another 
impersonation of HCE) her hand in marriage as a means of reconciliation (II.3). 
In combination with the mentioning of “Annamores leep” (626.1-2), which 
McHugh reads as an allusion to Edgar Allen Poe’s poem Annabel Lee, which 
tells the story of two very young, or even child-like characters, and a reference 
to “a youth in his florizel, a boy in innocence, peeling a twig, a child beside a 
weenywhite steed” (621.30), ALP’s soliloquy could be read as an act of 
purification and white-washing (in all possible meanings of the word) of sins 
committed throughout the text and a return to innocence. This idea is also 
                                                 
62 Symbols of darkness and light also serve as a metaphor for the symbolical dying of one generation and 
the dawning of a new era, just as the day succeeds the night. 
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supported by ALP’s statement that “[a]ll men has done something. Be the time 
they’ve come to the weight of old fletch. We’ll lave [French: wash] it” [621.32-
33]. In accordance with the idea that the sins committed in and by the text (for 
the syntax and the general meaning of the text also seems to become much 
clearer and the towards the end of the text) are washed away by ALP’s 
soliloquy, this part of the text would technically need to precede “The fall 
(bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonnerronntuonnthunntrovarrhou
nawnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!)” (3.15-17), since a state of innocence 
cannot follow after the fall, which is the embodiment of sin, but only exist 
beforehand. Clearly, this consideration creates yet another paradoxical situation 
with regard to the Wake’s beginning and ending and confirms the idea that the 
Wake’s ending is a beginning of sorts at the same time. 
As the time to merge with the ocean approaches, references to reluctance 
towards this process on ALP’s side become more frequent and she seems to 
become more aware of the fact that she will eventually have to give up her reign 
to her daughter:  
But I read in Tobecontinued’s tale that while blubles blows there’ll still be 
sealskers [Danish: lovers]. There’ll be others but non so for me. […] I was 
a princeable girl. And you were the pantymammy’s Vulking Corsergoth. 
The invision of Indelong. And, by Thorror, you looked it! My lips went livid 
from the joy of fear. Like almost now.[…] Only, no, now it’s me who’s got 
to give. As duv herself div. Inn this linn. And can it be it’s nnow fforvell? 
(626.18.33) 
Although ALP still mentions “Tobecontinued’s tale”, which symbolises a clinging 
on to the idea that her tale is not going to end after all, she is aware that “there’ll 
be other [lovers]”, but not for her. When HCE is re-imagined at this point, he is 
seen as an invader of Ireland and a Corsair (or) Goth, being strongly connected 
with aggression and violence, rather than being described in naïvely romantic 
tones (such as “a child beside a weenywhite steed”). ALP’s “joy of fear”, which 
could be both related to HCE and to her imminent flowing into the sea (“almost 
now”), turns into “horror” (Thorror) at the prospect of “fforvell”. The doubling of 
the lenis consonants “nn”, “ff” and “ll” also suggest an attempt at holding back 
the moment of parting at least for a few moments.  
As time progresses, ALP’s thoughts become more anxious and the “Thorror” 
of having to let go is palpable throughout her words, especially after she feels 
that “you’re changing, acoolsha, you’re changing from me, I can feel. Or is it me 
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is? I’m getting mixed” (626.35-36). While “a chuisle” is mostly used as a term of 
endearment in Gaelic, which would mean that ALP is addressing HCE (as an 
embodiment of Finn McCool, he is also present in “cool”), but probably also her 
daughter Issy, its literal translation would be “dear pulse”, which might suggest 
that ALP’s pulse changes and becomes quicker (as does the general pace of 
the narrative, especially on the very last page). Again, she addresses her 
“changing[…] sonhusband […] turning, I can feel you, for a daughterwife from 
the hills again” (627.1-2), before reverting to thoughts about being replaced by 
the “daughterwife” Issy:  
And she is coming. Swimming in my hindmoist. Diveltaking on me tail. 
Just a whisk brisk sly spry spink spank sprint of a thing theresome 
saultering. Saltarella come to her own. I pity your oldself I was used to. 
Now a younger’s there. Try not to part! Be happy, dear ones! May I be 
wrong! For she’ll be sweet for you as I was sweet when I came down out 
of me mother. […] First we feel, than we fall. And let her rain now if she 
likes. Gently or strongly as she likes. Anyway let her rain for my time is 
come. (627.3-13) 
At this point, at Issy’s actual “com[ing] down out of [her] mother”, ALP’s 
ambivalent feelings about handing down her reign to Issy become most 
apparent. On the one hand, she seems to pity that “a younger’s there” instead 
of her and that “[her] time is come”, but simultaneously, she assures her “dear 
ones” that Issy will be “as sweet for [them] as [ALP]” once was and wants to “let 
her rain now if she likes”. Of course, the reference to “sweet” and “salt[y]” might 
also mean that ALP is slowly becoming salty, while Issy, who is usually 
associated with the name “Saltarella”, is only at the beginning of her life as a 
river and therefore still sweet. At the same time, ALP’s discourse not only turns 
from sweet to salty, but also becomes very bitter: 
I done me best when I was let. […] A hundred cares, a tithe of troubles 
and is there one who understands me? […] All me life I have been lived 
among them but now they are becoming lothed to me. […] How small it’s 
all! […] I thought you were all glittering with the noblest of carriage. 
You’re only a bumpkin” (627.13-23).  
Both these accusing statements (of which the above quoted passage is just the 
beginning) and the fin-negating structure of Finnegans Wake imply that ALP 
has, in fact, not put up with the idea of her own finiteness. In a way, ALP 
attempts to transgress the boundaries of her character by rejecting everything 
she has hitherto loved or cared for (HCE, the city of Dublin, her family). Instead 
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of Molly’s rejoicing “Yes”, the reader is faced with ALP’s exasperated “no” (“no” 
[626.32] “No!” [627.26], “Niluna” [627.30]).  
Towards the very end of the book, after a last lamentous outbreak (“I am 
passing out. O bitter ending!” [627. 34]), however, ALP seems to have put up 
with her fate, although a certain amount of bitterness is still perceivable in her 
words: “And it’s old and old it’s sad and old it’s sad and weary I go back to you, 
my cold father, my cold mad father, my cold mad feary father, till the near sight 
of the mere size of him, the molyes and moyles of it, moananoaning, makes me 
seasilt saltsick and I rush, my only, into your arms” (627.36-628.4). It seems as 
if ALP has entirely lost the grammatical points of reference regarding HCE and 
her father respectively at this point, for it remains unclear which of the 
characters “my only” refers to. If the phrase is understood as representing her 
father, the ambivalence between her fear (“feary father”) and her eagerness to 
finally return to him (“I rush, my only, into your arms”) becomes even clearer 
than on the pages before. However, if “my only” in fact means HCE, ALP’s 
reluctance to the moment of mergence is stressed and explained through the 
fact that “the [mere] sight of the mere size of him […] makes [her] [seasick]”. 
ALP’s general state of uneasiness and anxiousness is also expressed in her 
plea to “[s]ave me from those therrble prongs! Two more. Onetwo moremens 
more” (628.5-6), before she seems to return into a calmer and more passive 
state:  
Avelaval. My leaves have drifted from me. All. But one clings still. I’ll bear 
it on me. To remind me of. LFF! So soft this morning, ours. Yes. Carry 
me along, taddy, like you done through the toy fair! […] Whish! A gull. 
Gulls. Far calls. Coming, far! End here. Us then. Finn, again! Take. 
Bussoftlhee, mememormee! Till thousendsthee. Lps. The keys to. Given! 
A way a lone a last a loved a long the (628.6-17) 
Once again, opposite meanings are reunited in “Avelaval” [Latin: Hail, 
Goodbye!], while “[m]y leaves have drifted from me. All. But one clings still” can 
be understood as yet another meta-reflexive reference to Finnegans Wake 
itself. Interestingly enough, ALP does not only re-course back to the beginning 
of the Wake, but also to the beginning of her own soliloquy at this point (“So soft 
morning, ours” / “Soft morning, city!” [619.20]). Eventually, ALP seems to accept 
her lot and utters a cautious, yet nevertheless affirmative “Yes”. While ALP 
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claims that the “End” is “here”, it is in fact constantly delayed (“Finn, again”63, 
“Thousendsthee”), until it simply does not arrive, just according to ALP’s initial 
plan and her tactics of prolonging the time before parting in the hope of finally 
avoiding it altogether. Once again, she wakes HCE (“Take. Bussoftlhee [But 
softly]”), while she becomes wider (“[me, me, more me]”) and eventually grows 
into the ocean. Another noteworthy detail lies in the prominent motif “A/O”, 
which is given an elegant twist, as the first chapter devoted to ALP (I.8) starts 
with the letter “O” (196.1) and Book IV ends with a repetition of “A”s, suggesting 
that ALP’s origin (the typographical arrangement of page 196 suggests that O is 
the spring from which Annalivia Plurabelle develops into the river Liffey) is, in 
fact, her ending, and once again blurring the boundaries between those two 
principles.  
The rest, indeed, is silence [Gaelic: whist], as “[t]he keys to [ALP’s] [Lips]” are 
“Given! A way”. 
                                                 
63 To the second-time reader, “Fin[n] again” might of course symbolise that the ending arrives for the 
second time. 
4. “Aloof is anoof” (FW 623.19-20) – Conclusion / Ricorso 
This thesis has examined the various ways in which the topic of endings and re-
beginnings is negotiated in James Joyce’s Ulysses and Finnegans Wake by 
applying Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories on time as representatives of a cyclical 
and linear view of time respectively and by approximating the idea of 
measureless and infinite time via the use of Henri Bergson’s notion of “pure 
duration” as expressed in Time and Free Will. These theories were incorporated 
into the study not only as a mere philosophical grid superimposed on the text, 
but also taken into consideration in combination with an in-depth literary 
analysis by means of close-reading. 
In Ulysses, time does not flow equally fast in all parts of the text. As this 
thesis strives to prove, the narrative time is stretched considerably during some 
parts of the narrative, in particularly at times when interior monologues are 
involved, thus allowing time to be slowed down metaphorically, presenting a 
coping strategy for the overflow of images with which a person in Modernist 
times might have been faced. Another instance where this effect is achieved is 
the chapter Eumaeus. On other occasions, time seems to be sped up (e.g. in 
Oxen of the sun, where the whole history of English literature is told in one 
chapter or on a more general level due to the fact that the events of the 
Odyssey are told in one day). Joyce convincingly shows that “time is relative to 
the system by which it is measured”, thus “point[ing] to Einstein’s theory that all 
temporal coordinates are relative to a specific reference system” (Kern 18). With 
regard to Henri Bergson’s theories of pure duration and simultaneity, it can be 
seen that pure duration is achieved in Penelope, whereas a genuine approach 
at simultaneity can be found in Sirens. Both of these phenomena are often 
hinted at, however, they only cumulate once, in their respective chapters. 
Finnegans Wake, on the other hand, presents the reader with a wholly 
different set of questions. The question in question, so to speak, is not only how 
time flows, but also why and where it flows (or, when thinking of Annalivia 
Plurabelle, who the flowing figure is in fact) and how its never-ending flux might 
be represented in a text that defies common boundaries by definition. One of 
the aims of this thesis was to show that in both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, 
the topic of endings, non-endings and re-beginnings is not only implicitly 
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touched upon on the level of structure and style, but also explicitly discussed on 
the level of plot. Therefore, after providing a general analysis of teleological and 
cyclical tendencies in Finnegans Wake, an analysis was conducted starting on 
the macro level, represented by the concept of the warring twin brothers Shem 
and Shaun, continuing on the micro-level of their representation in The Ondt 
and the Gracehoper, where Aristotelian and Platonic ideas could still be 
obverved, and finally cumulating in the very last pages of the text, which simply 
defies common notions of linearity and cyclicality due to its sheer rejection of 
any (textual as well as theoretical) limits or boundaries.  
Indeed, just as the process of reading can never actually be completed with 
Finnegans Wake, a literary analysis not only of Joyce’s œuvre, but of several 
modernist texts, proves to be a never-ending Work in Progress, due to their 
complexity and all-encompassing nature, but also with regard to their 
abundance of possible meaning, which an analysis should not try to narrow 
down. Various other Modernist works would have lend themselves for an 
application of the presented theories, most of all Samuel Beckett’s Endgame, 
but also T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, or Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, to 
name just a few. In order to incorporate all of these works, however, I would 
certainly need much more time and space, of which the Ondt and the 
Gracehoper seem to have so much, respectively. In order to prove that the end 
is really in the beginning, as Beckett suggests in his play Endgame (25), “I’ll 
begin again 
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7. APPENDIX 
Abstract  
This thesis seeks to investigate the manifold ways in which endings in James 
Joyce’s Ulysses and Finnegans Wake are negotiated, and sometimes even 
seemingly evaded altogether.  
My analysis is based on Plato’s and Aristotle’s concepts of time as a cyclical 
and teleological phenomenon, respectively. While Plato regarded human time as 
a (necessarily imperfect) reflection of eternal time, Aristotle coined the idea of 
time as a process, which leads towards a certain goal. In the case of human 
beings, this goal naturally equals death. However, in Joyce’s works, a simple line 
between life and death cannot be drawn, as death is always connected to a new 
beginning – this effect is most famously achieved at the end / re-beginning of 
Finnegans Wake, where ALP is said to „die into a new beginning“, as Seamus 
Deane insightfully remarked in his Introduction to the Penguin Modern Classics 
edition. However, even during the bleakest hours of Ulysses, a certain amount of 
hope is communicated through the use of imagery representing circularity and 
infinity (for instance in Proteus).  
Both the possibility of a certain kind of writing that manages to transgress time 
altogether and of writing which is necessarily connected to the very idea of time, 
without which, in fact, it could not even exist, are present in Joyce’s texts and 
have been analysed in this thesis. Just as timelessness can only be expressed 
through the medium of time itself, or an absence thereof, a transgression of form 
and the defiance of limits prove to be inextricably linked to form itself. Even the 
most timeless and unbound characters are still thinking about common notions of 
public time (in the midst of her famous monologue, Molly Bloom remarks that her 
watch is broken) and still obey at least some of the rules regarding form, thus 
creating a conceptional paradox of sorts.  
Rather than resolving this paradox, however, this thesis strives to embrace its 
chiasmic duality of the opposing principles inherent in both texts and affirm it with 
a climactic “Yes“, as one of the many achievements of Joyce’s texts is the idea 
that the they not only do not need to justify their seemingly paradoxical fusion of 
opposites, but that both sides of the same coin are, in fact, equally legitimate, but 
can only be so in connection with their counterpart, respectively, just like the 
brothers Shem and Shaun. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Arbeit setzt sich mit den vielfältigen Arten und Möglichkeiten auseinander, 
wie Enden in James Joyces Werken Ulysses und Finnegans Wake verhandelt 
werden, und in diesem Prozess bisweilen scheinbar vollständig umgangen werden 
können.  
Meine Analyse stützt sich auf das theoretische Fundament der Zeitphilosophie 
von Plato und Aristoteles. Während Plato menschliche Zeit als (zwangsweise 
imperfektes) Abbild der (göttlichen) Unendlichkeit betrachtete, stand bei 
Aristoteles die Idee von Zeit als Prozess im Vordergrund, die stets auf ein Ziel 
gerichtet ist. Im Fall der menschlichen Zeit ist dieses Ziel natürlich gleichsam das 
Ende, also der Tod. In Joyces Werken verläuft die Linie zwischen Leben und Tod 
jedoch nicht so klar, da der Tod stets mit einem Wiederaufbruch und Neubeginn 
verbunden ist – das berühmteste Beispiel dieses Effekts wird am Ende / 
Neubeginn von Finnegans Wake erreicht, als ALP, mit den Worten von Seamus 
Deane, in einen Neubeginn stirbt („ALP dies into a new beginning“), wie er in der 
Einleitung zur Penguin Popular Classics – Edition treffend bemerkt. Allerdings 
gibt es auch während der freudlosesten und düstersten Zeiten in Ulysses 
Momente der Hoffnung, die stets mit einer Symbolik von Zirkularität und 
Unendlichkeit verbunden sind (so zum Beispiel in Proteus). 
Sowohl die Möglichkeit eines Schreibens, das über die Zeit hinauszugehen 
scheint, und eines Schreibens, das notgedrungen sehr stark an die Zeit an sich 
gebunden ist – ohne die sie, in Wahrheit, nicht existieren könnte! – sind in Joyces 
Werken präsent und wurden in dieser Arbeit analysiert. Sowie Zeitlosigkeit nur im 
Zusammenhang mit Zeit selbst (oder deren Fehlen) ausgedrückt werden kann, ist 
auch die Überschreitung von formellen Grenzen nur über diese Grenzen 
kommunizierbar. Selbst die zeitlosesten Charaktere in Joyce’s Werken 
beschäftigen sich mit allgemein gebräuchlichen Auffassungen von sozial 
definierter Zeit (mitten in ihrem berühmten Monolog bemerkt Molly Bloom, dass 
ihre Uhr kaputt ist) und gehorchen zumindest bis zu einem gewissen Grad den 
formalen Vorgaben eines Textes, was zu einer Art Paradoxon führt. Anstatt 
dieses resultierende Paradoxon auflösen zu wollen, möchte diese Arbeit dessen 
chiasmische Dualität mit einem klimaktischen „Ja“ bereitwillig annehmen, wie es 
auch eine der Errungenschaften des Textes ist, solche Dualitäten nicht 
rechtfertigen zu müssen und stattdessen einen produktiven Umgang damit zu 
ermöglichen.  
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